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The concept and practice of legal capacity is well known since the ancient times. The history 
of humankind has several times compelled the lawmakers to revise and re-examine the 
understanding of the concept of legal capacity itself. In different societies and at different 
times, some groups were not granted the same rights as others, never had the right to act on 
behalf of themselves. Some groups, like slaves in Roman law were not even perceived as 
human beings and were rather seen as property.1 It was not because slaves were different 
from other humans, but because of the existing law and as James Walvin rightfully stated: “It 
was a system often supported by draconian slave codes that relegated the slave to a position 
nearer to the animal kingdom than to humanity.”2 Slavery existed until the end of the 19th 
century3 and only after the abolition of slavery the members of this group were granted the 
civil and political rights. 
 
Alongside slaves, women also remained without the full legal capacity for a long period. In 
ancient Rome, after reaching the adulthood women remained under the guardianship of their 
fathers, or were placed under husbands’ special care.4 This pattern remained active in Europe 
throughout the Middle Ages.5 In some countries like Saudi Arabia,6 Oman7 and Kuwait8 even 
nowadays women and girls are still placed under the male guardianship. In Jordan women 
need to obtain guardians’ permission for marriage, divorce, work or movement.9 In Europe 
women were denied the right to education and voting even in the first half of the 20th century. 
For example, in 1873, female students lost their claim against the Edinburgh University over 
the opportunity to complete their degrees in medicine. It was stated during the hearing that 
“from the year 1411 to about the year 1860, a period of 450 years, there is no instance 
																																																						
1 P. du Plessis. Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015, p. 90. 
2 J. Walvin. Atlas of Slavery. New York: Routledge 2014, p. 27. 
3 Ibid., Map 81, p. 124. 
4 C. Sanfilippo. Kurs Rimskogo častnogo prava. Perevod s italʹânskogo. Pod obŝej redakciej, prof D.V Doždeva. 
Moskva: NORMA 2012, p. 86. 
5 C. Benati. Voremunde Hebben: Children, Elderly and Impaired People in Eike von Repgow’s Sachsenspiegel. 
- P. Andersen, M. Münster-Swendsen & H. Vogt (ed). Law and Private Life in the Middle Ages. Copenhagen: 
DJOF Publishing, 2011, p. 209. 
6 CEDAW, Concluding observation on the combined third and fourth periodic reports of Saudi Arabia, 
CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/3-4, 14.03.2018, para 15. 
7 CEDAW, Concluding observations on the combined second and third periodic reports of Oman, 
CEDAW/C/OMN/CO/2-3, 22.11.2017, para 54. 
8 CEDAW, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic reports of Kuwait, CEDAW/C/KWT/CO/5, 
22.11.2017, para 15. 





proceedable of a woman having been educated at any Scottish University.”10 In France denial 
of political rights for women was justified because “women were intellectually incapable of 
understanding politics, and, in any case, were not interested in it.”11 Only in 1944 women in 
France were able to obtain the right to vote.12 It happened a little earlier in other European 
countries: Finland granted to women the capacity to vote in 1906,13 Estonia in 191814 and 
Britain in 1928.15 In USA the class and race of women were decisive in granting them rights 
and even after the victory of women’s suffrage, black women continued to be prevented from 
exercising their newly obtained rights.16  
 
The understanding of legal capacity in the 21th century was once again strongly shaken by 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).17 Adopted in 2006, the CRPD 
recognized on the international level that persons with disabilities cannot be denied legal 
capacity based on disability; cannot be described or treated as legally incapable and cannot be 
waived from the enjoyment of all civil and political rights. The idea was reaffirmed in the 
Article 12 (Equal recognition before the law): “States Parties shall recognize that persons 
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life”.18  
 
The above statement does not mean that CRPD was the first ever international document 
addressing disability issues. For example, in 1971 the General Assembly proclaimed the 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons.19 In 1975, the General Assembly 
also proclaimed Declaration on the Rights of Disabled persons.20 In 1993, the General 
Assembly adopted resolution on Standard Rules on the Equalization of opportunities for 
																																																						
10 J. Bridgeman and S. Millns. Feminist Perspectives on Law: Law’s Engagement with the Female Body. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell 1998, p. 12. 
11 S. Chaperon. The Difficult Struggle for Women’s Political Rights in France. - B. Rodriquez-Ruiz, R. Rubio-
Marin (ed). The Struggle for Female Suffrage in Europe: Voting to Become Citizens. Leiden: Brill 2012, p. 312. 
12 Ibid., p. 306. 
13 A. Korppi-Tommola. A Long Tradition of Equality: Women’s Suffrage in Finland. - B. Rodriquez-Ruiz, R. 
Rubio-Marin (ed). The Struggle for Female Suffrage in Europe: Voting to Become Citizens. Leiden: Brill 2012, 
p. 47.   
14 H. Biin and A. Albi. Suffrage and the Nation: Women’s Vote in Estonia. - B. Rodriquez-Ruiz, R. Rubio-
Marin, (ed). The Struggle for Female Suffrage in Europe: Voting to Become Citizens. Leiden: Brill 2012, p. 120. 
15 K. Cowman. Female Suffrage in Great Britain. - B. Rodriquez-Ruiz, R. Rubio-Marin, (edit.). The Struggle for 
Female Suffrage in Europe: Voting to Become Citizens. Leiden: Brill 2012, p. 273. 
16 A.Y. Davis. Women, Race and Class. New York: Random House Inc. 1981, p. 87. 
17 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, New York 13.12.2006, entry into force force 
03.05.2008. 
18 Ibid., Article 12(2). 
19 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons. UN General Assembly A/RES/2856(XXVI), adopted 
20.12.1971. 





Persons with Disabilities.21 In 1999 the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities was adopted.22 However, none of 
these documents managed to address legal capacity issues of persons with disabilities and, 
except for the Inter-American Convention, none of them were legally binding. Also, the 
documents from 1971 and 1975 were based on the medical model of disability and 
impairment was still seen as a legitimate ground for restricting or denying rights.23 Thus, the 
CRPD was the first legally binding international instrument, which enabled persons with 
disabilities, particularly people with mental and intellectual disabilities and psycho-social 
needs – a group of people, who for the longest period in history were in practice denied legal 
capacity and consequently certain other civil rights and duties - to choose, to act on behalf of 
themselves and finally enjoy full citizenship.  
 
As part of the international community and signatory to most international human rights 
treaties, Georgia ratified the CRPD on 13 March 2014.24 In October of the same year the 
Georgian Constitutional Court  made a decision25 under which it was declared 
unconstitutional to remove legal capacity from a person. This judgment placed the dispute for 
comprehensive legal amendments concerning legal capacity issues and related procedures on 
the agenda of Georgia’s Parliament, which by February 2015 prepared amendments all at 
once for 65 legal acts, adopted them after a month and finally entered them into force on 1 
April 2015.26  
 
The presented paper seeks to assess whether the Georgian legislative amendments concerning 
legal capacity and the procedures of its determination are in compliance with the standards set 
out by the CRPD and particularly by its Article 12 (Equal recognition before the law). The 
paper will identify the aspects of the legal capacity reform in Georgia which meet the 
requirements of international standards; the remaining material and procedural gaps and 
inconsistencies which keep preventing persons with disabilities from enjoying their legal 
capacity and related rights in various aspects of life on equal basis with others. Analyzing 
																																																						
21 Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for persons with Disabilities. UN General Assembly 
A/RES/48/96, adopted 04.03.1994. 
22 Inter-American Convention on The Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Persons with 
Disabilities. Guatemala 06.08.1999, entry into force 14.09.2001. 
23 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General comment No. 6 (2018), CRPD/C/GC/6, 
26.04.2018.	
24 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. New York 13.12.2006, entry into force 03.05.2008.  
25 The Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, N2/4.532,533, Irakli Kemoklidze and David Kharadze 
against the Parliament of Georgia date 08.10.2014. 




both, successes and failures of the reform will support the advocacy efforts for further 
legislation amendments to remedy identified gaps and ensure equality for persons with 
disabilities in practice. It will also offer important insights to countries, which have ratified 
the CRPD and have to reform their legislation on legal capacity in compliance with its 
standards. The Georgian case study can be particularly interesting for post-Soviet countries 
like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Russian Federation, and even Estonia. These 
countries have also ratified the CRPD but are still practicing denial of legal capacity to 
persons with disabilities. For example, the Civil Code of Russia permits recognition of a 
person as legally incapable because of mental disorder and therefore, s/he is placed under 
guardianship.27 The Civil Code of Armenia makes the same statement.28 Under The Civil 
Code of Moldova recognition of a person as legally incapable is permissible in case of mental 
disorder, mental illness or deficiency.29 The Civil Code of Azerbaijan uses more outdated 
wording such as “mental retardation or mental disease” applied by the courts as the basis for 
declaring a person as legally incapable and establishing guardianship over them.30 The same 
wording and concept of legal capacity is used in the Civil Codes of Belarus.31 Estonian 
legislation does not allow total incapacitation; however it permits restriction of legal capacity 
to a certain extent when a person is perceived to be unable to understand or direct her/his 
actions based on disability (mental illness, mental disability, other mental disorders).32  
 
In 2016 the Public Defender of Georgia published the research report “Legal Capacity – 
Legislative Reform without Implementation.”33 The report mainly focused on the Georgian 
Common Courts practice about recognizing persons with disabilities as support-recipients 
between April 2015 - January 2016, i.e during the first nine months after the reform was 
introduced in Georgia. The peresented paper will expand on the existing report through 
offering a more comprehensive understanding of: the values and approaches to disability 
which underpin the concept of legal capacity in the CRPD; the standards proposed by the 
CRPD; the gaps overlooked in the Public Defender’s report and by means of answering the 
																																																						
27 Graždanskij kodeks Rossijskoj Federacii (Russian Civil Code, Part 1). Adopted 21.10.1994, entry into force 
01.01.1995, Art 29(1). 
28 The Civil Code of Armenia. Adopted 05.05.1998, entry into force 01.01.1999, Art 31(1).	
29 Codul Civil Al Republicii Moldova (The Civil Code of the Republic of Moldova). Adopted 06.06.2002, entry 
into force 22.06.2002, Art (24). 
30 Azərbaycan Respublikasının Mülki Məcəlləsi (The Civil Code of Azerbaijan Republic). Adopted 28.12.1999, 
entry into force 01.09.2000, Art 28(8). 
31 Hraždanskиj kodieks Riespublиkи Bielaruś (The Civil Code of the republic of Belarus). Adopted 28.10.1998, 
entry into force 01.07.1999, Art 29(1). 
32 Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus (Riigikogu General Part of the Civil Code Act). Adopted 27.03.2002, entry 
into force 01.07.2002, Art 8(2). 





following questions: (i) what are the main requirements of Article 12 of the CRPD in 
achieving equality for persons with disabilities on equal basis with others; (ii) how Georgia 
has implemented Article 12 of the CRPD in its legislation; (iii) how legislative changes were 
applied in Common Court practice? 
  
To address the questions posed above, the paper primarily applies analytical method of 
research supplemented by the comparative method. The research is largely qualitative, carried 
out from a legal, human rights perspective. It comprehensively analyzes national laws 
amended during the legal capacity reform in Georgia as well as Georgian Courts judgments 
about the recognition of persons as support-recipients in order to assess if there are any gaps 
remaining in the legal framework or in practice that need to be addressed. For this purpose, 
the Georgian laws and court judgments will be analyzed in the light of the requirements of the 
CRPD. Therefore, the CRPD and the relevant documents issued by the CRPD Committee will 
also be analytically examined. Comparative method will be used to make references to the 
Estonian legislation where applicable in order to highlight the prevalence of the research 
problem in Estonia as well.34 The presented analysis and comparison is supplemented by the 
study of relevant literature, expert opinions and reports of international organizations.  
 
The paper evolves around the hypothesis that (i) the Georgian legislative amendments made 
in 2015 concerning legal capacity of persons with disabilities have met the minimum main 
requirements of the international standard set out in the CRPD; (ii) despite the important 
changes introduced in the legislation, a number of significant impediments remain, 
obstructing effective implementation of the reform in practice. Consequently, the main 
research objects of the thesis include Georgian laws which were amended or have been 
introduced as a result of the legal capacity reform in 2015; national court judgments – a total 
of 247 (two hundred forty-seven)35 of them decided between 2015 - 2018 concerning the 
recognition of persons with disabilities as support-recipients36; the CRPD and various 
documents issued by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the 
																																																						
34 The purpose of the presented thesis is not to compare the law and practice of different States on the research 
problem. Therefore, the comparison between the Georgian and Estonian law will be made only with regard to 
the core issues of legal capacity. These comparisons can trigger further research in Estonian academia for 
analyzing Estonian law connected with legal capacity issues of persons with disabilities.  
35 Infra. Appendix 1. Table of Georgian Cases. 
36 In Georgia only Supreme Courts’ judgments are publicly available. In order to analyze the First Court and 
Appeal Courts practice, the author of the thesis officially requested the judgments regarding the legal capacity 
issues from 13 Courts of different cities and regions. The number of judgments to be provided depends on each 
Court. By the Courts were provided a total of 247 judgments. As the legal capacity reform was carried out in 




Committee) including General Comments and 75 (seventy-five) concluding observations on 
the reports of CRPD member States between 2011-201837; Estonian legislation on legal 
capacity and guardianship issues. Alongside the mentioned documents, studies and articles by 
international disability law professionals on the models of disability and legal capacity will 
also be examined as well as the reports of the Georgian Public Defender on the legal capacity 
reform.  
 
The thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter elaborates on various models of 
disability, analyzing how the understanding of disability gradually shifted from the medical to 
the social model and finally how the concept of disability evolved around the human rights 
model. Exploring these developments up to the human rights model is important, as this 
model underpins the principles enshrined in the CRPD and without examining the major 
values and principles on which the CRPD was built, it is difficult to understand the paradigm 
shift proposed by the CRPD including by its Article 12 and the concept of legal capacity for 
persons with disabilities.  
 
The second chapter explains and explores the concept of legal capacity for persons with 
disabilities put forward by the CRPD and its Article 12 through the analysis of documents 
issued by the Committee, particularly, General Comment N1 (2014) the Committee’s 
concluding observations on the reports of member States starting from 201138 to 2018, the 
views adopted by the Committee during the individual communications. Reference to ECtHR 
cases are made where applicable. The chapter also makes references to  the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Persons with disabilities39 
and the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons40 in 
order to explain the development of the new paradigm of legal capacity after adoption of the 
CRPD. Alongside these international documents, the chapter also provides an overview of the 
research conducted in disability law about the understanding of legal capacity.  
 
																																																						
37 Between 2011-2018 the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities issued overall 75 concluding 
observations on the state parties initial or annual reports.  
38 According to Article 35(1) of the CRPD, State Parties shall submit to the Committee reports on 
implementation of the CRPD within two years after the entry into force of the CRPD. The CRPD entered into 
force May 2008. First reports by member States where made in 2010 and the first concluding observations by 
the CRPD Committee was made in 2011. 
39 Protocol to the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in Africa. Addis Ababa 29.01.2018, Art 7. 
40 Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons. Washington, D.C. 15.06.2015, 




The third chapter deals with the description and analysis of the Georgian situation of legal 
capacity of persons with disabilities. It briefly analyzes the Georgian Constitutional Court 
judgment on the legal capacity, which triggered the legal capacity reform in Georgia; it looks 
at the amendments made in the Georgian legislation to comply with the legal capacity reform 
and international standards and analyses the Georgian Courts judgments on the issue; 
underlines the successful changes in legislation as well as the gaps, ambiguities and 
inconsistencies, which remain in the Georgian legislation. The chapter also provides 
comparisons with Estonian legislation on some of the most important legal capacity issues 
and briefly describes how they are regulated in Estonia. The analysis presented in this chapter 
is based on the evaluation through the lenses of all the international standards laid down in 
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1. MODELS OF UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY AND THE CRPD 
	
1.1 Medical Model of Disability 
The CRPD is a multidimensional achievement of the disability movement, disability and 
sociology scholars and legal professionals. The ideology which underpins the CRPD and the 
changes it has brought into humanity can better be understood by deconstructing the stages of 
approaches towards disability and how they have evolved during the recent history of 
humankind starting with the most archaic medical approach; continuing with the latest 
disability movement history and the social model of disability; later developments made in 
academia in disability studies and finalizing with all the knowledge and experiences 
accumulated into the CRPD which proposes the human rights approach to disability.  
 
According to WHO, over a billion people, about 15% of the world’s population, have some 
form of disability.41 Hypothetically, if we assume that one billion persons with disabilities 
have at least one family member, relative, or a close friend, it would mean that disability 
directly affects a minimum 30% of the world population. By the most outdated medical 
model of disability the issues of this 30% of population were seen as an individual problem. 
Medical model of disability characterized disability as a pathology, where person with 
disability is alone with their “personal limitation”42, physical or mental dysfunction and it is 
the impairment which impedes their inclusion in the society or makes them unable to compete 
with able-bodied persons on the labor market.43 This model views the social and physical 
environment completely unproblematic and all focus is placed on allocated resources to “fix 
persons with disabilities”44 in order to make them fit for the society.  
 
In general, any approach, which assesses disability from the medical point of view only, 
perceives it is as a deviation from normality and an individual problem of persons with 
impairments and fails to see the problem in the societal environment, can be described as the 
‘medical model’ of disability. However, in 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Office of 
the High Commissioner released a professional training package guide to the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, where it also briefly presents the charity approach to 
																																																						
41 World Health Organization. World Report on Disability, WHO/NMH/11.01, 2011, p. 7. 
42 C. Cameron (ed). Disability Studies: A Student’s Guide. London: SAGE 2014, p. 99. 
43 R.D. Kelemen & L. Vanhala. The Shift to the Rights Model of Disability in the EU and Canada. - Regional 
and Federal Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1-18, March 2010, p. 3. 




disability. 45 According to this approach, persons with disabilities are passive objects of kind 
acts, target of pity and dependent on the goodwill of society.46 
 
Barbara Fawcett describes different explanations as to why the medical model of disability 
emerged within the society.47 On the one hand, she provides an account of the birth of the 
medical model of disability through Foucault’s view, that creation of the disciplinary society 
since the 17th century made the feudal rights shift to the property rights and the sovereign 
power to “disciplinary power”48, thus those who were unable to discipline themselves and fit 
into the general conditions, were “subject to dividing practices, which created divisions 
healthy/ill, sane/mad, legal/delinquent and, it is possible to add able-bodied/disabled-
bodied”.49 On the other hand, Fawcett provides Scull’s explanation from the Marxist 
perspective according to which, urbanization and scientific ideology in the 19th century 
allowed medical professionals the opportunity to benefit financially from the societal changes 
and medicalization of disability was the consequence of these processes.50 Finally, she also 
offers Barnes’ explanation of the medical model, as medically oriented product of the 19th 
century, which evolved due industrialization, population increase, science and eugenics.51 
 
Among these reasons, the doctrine of eugenics52 (until 1945) adopted in policies of the 
majority of the developed western world (USA, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Germany)53 had the most severe consequences for persons with disabilities with the Third 
Reich practice between 1933-1939 characterized with the most extreme cruelty. Namely, the 
Third Reich actively practiced euthanasia, extermination in gas chambers (several hundred 
thousand children and adults with mental health conditions or learning difficulties), 
extermination by lethal injections or by gun.54 
 
The medical model of disability was a dominant approach to disability until the 1970s-80s, 
before it started to become the subject of critique by disability scholars in Europe and the 
																																																						
45 United Nations Humans Rights Office of the High Commissioner. The Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, Training Guide, Professional Training Series No. 19. Geneva: United Nations 2014, pp. 8-9. 
46 Ibid., p. 8. 
47 B. Fawcett. Feminist Perspectives on Disability. London: Pearson Education Limited 2000, pp. 16-26. 
48 Ibid., p. 18.  
49 Ibid., p. 10. 
50 Ibid., p. 19. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Eugenics- the idea that it is possible to improve humans by allowing only some people to produce children, - 
Cambridge University Press, Online Cambridge Dictionary, 2018, 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/eugenics.   
53  T. Shakespeare. Disability: The Basics. New York: Routledge 2018, p. 37.  




emerging social movements, which generated resistance to the existing laws both in Europe 
and USA.  
 
1.2 Social Model of Disability 
Activists with disabilities in the UK started their fight against the medical model of disability 
in the 1960s. Demands of some activists groups at that time were small-scale such as benefits 
for married disabled women who had never worked while other groups, like Union of the 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), put forward a broader political agenda.55 
Particularly, UPIAS argued that the society was the one who disabled, isolated and excluded 
persons with physical impairments.  This approach later became known as the ‘social model’ 
of disability penned by Michael Oliver, a scholar with disabilities, in his articles about 
disability published in the 1980s.56  
 
Meanwhile, the social model of disability started emerging in the USA too, due to strong civil 
movements and individual efforts of persons with disabilities to achieve greater 
independence. Edward Roberts was one of the first advocates with disabilities who started 
challenging the social and physical environment in the 1970s, realizing that attending school 
with iron lungs was not a problem in itself, rather it was a problem within the environment 
and the society and their refusal and unpreparedness to accept and accommodate people with 
different conditions and characteristics.57 He was one of the first proponents of Independent 
Living philosophy in the USA and he became the embodiment of the principle of self-
determination for people with disabilities.58 Alongside Edward Roberts and in the same 
period, Judith Heumann, another activist with disabilities, individually started confronting the 
existing rules which were based on the medical model and started her fight with a lawsuit 
against the prohibitive regulations of New York City Board of Education, according to which 
persons with disabilities were unable to work as teachers. The Board of Education justified 
these regulations based on the perceived inability of persons with disabilities to escort 




55 Ibid., p. 12. 
56 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
57 D. Zames Fleischer and F. Zames. The Disability Rights Movement: From Charity to Confrontation. 
Philadelphia: Tample University Press 2014, pp. 37-38. 
58 Ibid., p.40. 




The main ideological shift proposed by the social model of disability was the refocusing of 
attention from individual impairments to the social factors and identification of external 
barriers as the main obstacles to the inclusion in the mainstream society. This new 
understanding of disability which proclaimed that impairment should be considered as a 
difference60 and not something to be ashamed of; which viewed stereotypes and stigma 
toward persons with disabilities as an important problem and argued that the existing rules 
and regulations on disability generated segregation, made it possible for persons with 
disabilities to form a strong disability identity. They became psychologically and emotionally 
strongly attached to the social model analysis.61 Another disability scholar, Tom Shakespeare, 
compares the formation of disability identity politics with other social movements and argues 
that social movements like women’s liberation, gay rights, anti-racism and disability rights 
are similar in many ways, as each of them challenges the pathologization of differences and 
forms a strong alliance between academia and activism.62 
 
With the emergence of the social model, scholars and activists started to pay specific attention 
to the disability related terminology and language. The central significance was placed on the 
definition of disability itself and the distinction between impairment and disability. 
Shakespeare compares impairment/disability distinction with the sex-gender dichotomy. He 
argues that just like the feminists insisted on the distinctions between sex: the biological 
difference between male and female, and gender: the socio-cultural distinction between men 
and women, or masculine and feminine, it can be claimed that “sex corresponds to 
impairment, and gender corresponds to disability. Impairment is the deficit of body or mind; 
disability is the social oppression and exclusion”.63 He also argues strongly that these two 
terms are not dichotomous but a continuum of one notion and where impairment ends, 
disability starts.64 This is a significant statement to be taken under consideration, as the 
strongest argument of the social model, which rejected any importance of impairment and 
thus brought the concept of disability into the light, later became its weakest point and the 
subject of major criticism from the scholars and activists alike.  
 
Despite this criticism the shift from medical to social model of disability has had influential 
consequences on the lives of persons with disabilities. The social model gave stimuli to 
																																																						
60 Ibid. p. 122. 
61 T. Shakespeare. Disability Rights and Wrongs Revisited. London: Routledge 2014, p. 20. 
62 Ibid., p. 29. 
63 Shakespeare 2018, op. cit., p. 13. 




disabled people to fight against social oppression, challenge socially constructed barriers and 
the segregating laws or policies and what is most important, it enabled persons with 
disabilities to view themselves as expert on their lives and establish and enforce the principle 
of ‘nothing about us without us’.65 It is not coincidental that the CRPD emerged within social 
model understanding and is often described as the ‘culmination of social model approach’66. 
In addition, while building on the social model, the CRPD furthermore introduces a new 
concept of human rights model of disability.  
 
1.3 Human Rights Model of Disability 
In its General Comment No. 6 on equality and non-discrimination the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities clearly states and reaffirms that the ideology enhanced in 
the CRPD is indeed the human rights model of disability. The document provides a definition 
of the human rights model and the aspects in which it precedes, or varies from previous 
models of understanding disability.67 According to this definition, the “human rights model of 
disability recognizes that disability is a social construct and impairments must not be taken as 
a legitimate ground for the denial or restriction of human rights. It acknowledges that 
disability is one of several layers of identity”.68  
 
The human rights model of disability is not just a simple continuation of the social model. It 
can be seen more as a reconciliation of medical and social models of disability, by taking into 
account the critiques of the social model and recognizing that people can be disabled by 
society as well as by their bodies.69 Theresia Degener provides account of at least six main 
differences between the social and human rights models of disability, six main aspects why it 
is possible to argue that the CRPD effectively transforms the social model of disability into 
the human rights model. According to Degener, if the social model of disability was 
developed as an explanation of exclusion of disabled people from society, the human rights 
model seeks to provide moral principles and values for disability policy,70 and ensures that no 
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person with disability is denied legal capacity.71 She goes on to suggest that while the social 
model of disability supports anti-discrimination policy and focuses on civil rights, the human 
rights model covers civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights.72 
Degener also argues that the social model of disability rejects impairment entirely, while the 
human rights model recognizes that impairment has influence on people’s lives and it is 
compatible with the human dignity.73 Furthermore, Degener suggests that as the social model 
of disability neglects identity politics as an important factor of emancipation, the human 
rights model is open for cultural identification.74 Like Shakespeare, Degener also compares 
disability efforts with gay pride, black pride and feminism and acknowledges the importance 
of identity politics.75 Finally, as the two differentiating aspects between the social and human 
rights models, Degener names the ability of the human rights model to provide non-
discriminatory preventive health policies and disability inclusive development and 
humanitarian aid.76 
 
In addition to the six characteristics reviewed above, inclusive equality as a new model of 
equality is another valuable improvement to the field of human rights brought about by the 
human rights model of understanding disability. The concept of equality and its complex 
understanding is vital for international human rights law, as equality alongside with non-
discrimination and human dignity, is the cornerstone of all human rights.77   
 
In 2011, Marcia H. Rioux and Christopher A. Riddle provided comprehensive account of the 
evolution of the concept of equality from formal equality to equal opportunity model and 
further describe substantive equality as the model of equality, which is able to identify that 
equality cannot be reached only by removal of barriers without recognition of systematic 
discrimination of disadvantaged groups.78 It took only seven years after their research to 
construct the new, more complex and extended notion of equality. This new understanding of 
‘inclusive equality’ proposed in the CRPD could provide a good answer to the critique of the 
human rights model of disability. According to the critique, the human rights model of 
disability contains neoliberal individualistic rhetoric, which automatically excludes 
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discussions about the collective nature of social inequality and the need for extensive social 
changes.79 However, it can be argued that the new, inclusive equality takes into account many 
forms of marginalization on an individual level as well as the group level and provides the 
following extended understanding of equality: “(a) a fair redistributive dimension to address 
socioeconomic disadvantages; (b) a recognition dimension to combat stigma, stereotyping, 
prejudice and violence and to recognize the dignity of human beings and their 
intersectionality; (c) a participative dimension to reaffirm the social nature of people as 
members of social groups and the full recognition of humanity through inclusion in society; 
and (d) an accommodating dimension to make space for difference as a matter of human 
dignity. The Convention is based on inclusive equality.”80 
 
One of the biggest critiques of the human rights model of disability points to its failure to pay 
attention to the reality of the Global South. Helen Meekosha & Karen Soldatic heavily 
criticize the inability of the human rights model to reflect the dynamics of the Global South 
and to take into account the differences between the Global North and the Global South by 
referring to the Global North as the “civilized” part of the world and the Global South as 
“traditional”.81 Despite this critique, the authors acknowledge the vital role of human rights 
for the disability movement and reaffirm that: “there is no doubt that the ongoing 
internationalizing project of human rights remains of critical importance for disability 
activists and disabled people across the globe”.82 
 
1.4 Soviet Legacy of Understanding Disability in Georgia 
Western countries started to reconsider approaches toward the disability from medical 
approaches to social since the 60’s of the 20th century, which triggered rigorous disability 
studies and the shift toward the human rights approach, while as part of the Soviet Union over 
70 years (1918-1991), Georgia had to adhere to the Soviet Regime and implement policies 
according to the Soviet ideology. Consequently, the approaches, social policies and laws 
about disability were developed and practiced as required by the Soviet Regime. As in most 
																																																						
79 M. Sherry. The Promise of Human Rights for Disabled People and the Reality of Neoliberalism. – M. Gill and 
C. J. Schlund-Vials (ed). Disability, Human Rights and the Limits of Humanitarianism. Farnham: Ashgate 2014, 
p. 19.   
80 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General comment No.6 (2018), CRPD/C/GC/6, 
26.04.2018, para 11. 
81 H. Meekosha & K. Soldatic. Human Rights and the Global South: The Case of Disability. Third World 
Quarterly 2011, Vol 32, No. 8, pp. 1388-1394. 




post-soviet countries, the disability history in Soviet and post-Soviet Georgia has not been 
studied and the disability-related research started to appear only after the 2000s.83  
 
This lack of disability research can be explained by the Soviet ideology and approaches to 
disability. For example, a soviet psychiatrist Ivan Vvedinsky proposed the following 
definition of disability in 1959: “a condition of an organism transformed by disease or aging 
and characterized by enduring or irreversible functional disturbances that results in the 
permanent or prolonged, complete or partial, loss of one’s ability to work”.84 Interestingly, 
being a psychiatrist might have played a role in coming up with such a definition and can 
serve a demonstration of how disability issues were dealt with and how disability was 
perceived in general. Based on the definition stated above, a person with disability is not even 
described as an individual, but an organism. Moreover, disability as a term was not in use in 
the Soviet Union. Disability was called invalidity (инвалидность), which is still the term 
used even in the official Russian translation of the CRPD.85 Even though the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities stated in its concluding observations on the initial 
report of the Russian Federation that the official Russian translation of the term persons with 
disabilities as invalid does not reflect the human rights model enshrined in the CRPD,86 the 
term remains in use.  
 
Ability to work was very crucial to the Soviet ideology. Persons without employment 
including disabled veterans were branded as socially harmful elements, social deviants and 
were persecuted by special police units.87 They were urged to leave cities and settle into 
residential homes located in remote areas of the Soviet Union.88 If physically impaired 
persons were perceived as socially harmful elements because of their inability to work, people 
with mental health issues were viewed as dangerous, who were listed on Psychiatric Case 
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Registers and kept in psychoneurological hospitals, out of public sight.89 These attitudes 
toward disability were encouraged by the Soviet ideology, which viewed persons with 
disabilities as a threat to the state-cultivated image of happy and productive Soviet citizens.90 
It is not surprising that this attitude led to the well-known exclamation from a Soviet official 
in 1980: “There are no disabled people in the USSR!” when he was asked whether the Soviet 
Union would participate in the first Paralympic Games.91 
 
After declaring independence in 199192, Georgia inherited the Soviet legacy of approaches, 
stereotypes and policies about disability. Efforts to eliminate the outdated concepts in policy 
papers and laws and challenge the societal attitudes began at the onset of the 20th century and 
grew more active since 2014, after Georgia’s ratification of the CRPD. For example, the 
human rights action plans developed during 2014-2018 started to include more provisions 
about the harmonization of the Georgian legislation with the CRPD93; disability was included 
as one of the protected grounds in the 2014 law on “Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination”94; the country started closing down children’s large residential institutions95, 
adopted a government resolution to ensure accessible environments96 and implemented the 
legal capacity reform.97 Despite these changes and reforms, which are based on human rights 
model of disability, the grounds for obtaining a disability status are still solely based on the 
medical assessment. The Soviet categorization of persons with disabilities under “invalids” of 
I, II and III categories based on their degree of impairment, continues to prevail in 
contemporary Georgia with only the names of the category replaced with “profound”, 
“moderate” and “mild” respectively,98 but the core approach and practice staying similar to 
the Soviet ones. This policy is problematic because it does not correspond to the CRPD and 
the human rights model, ignores the individual needs and capacities of each person with 
disability. Thus, by the time Georgia ratified the CRPD, the understanding of disability and 
disability policies were a continuation of the Soviet time approaches. 
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2. STANDARD OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
	
2.1 Debates over the Article 12 During the Ad Hoc Committee 
The previous chapter argued that the most important feature of the CRPD is that it is the first 
legally binding human rights instrument, which was based on understanding that even the 
possibility to enjoy all human rights can also be socially constructed, and how external 
barriers can be the impediment for the realization of these rights.99 The CRPD on the one 
hand proposes a number of new principles and rights such as Accessibility (Article 9), 
Independent Living (Article 19) and Reasonable Accommodation (Article 5) while on the 
other hand it offers new understanding or paradigm shift (mostly described so by disability 
law scholars) for one of the oldest legal concepts - legal capacity.100  
 
Introduction of the entirely new understanding of legal capacity with regard to persons with 
disabilities immediately generated numerous debates not only after the adoption of the CRPD, 
but during the Ad Hoc Committee work itself. It was the most debatable article, resolving of 
which could offer solutions for other issues in the CRPD.101 The importance and the novelty 
of the article was itself the reason for adopting the first General Comment (GC) of the CRPD 
regarding this article. For understanding the scope of the legal capacity proposed by the 
CRPD, it is most important to analyze Article 12 (legal capacity) itself in connection with the 
GC No.1. It is also necessary to take a close look at the observations by the CRPD Committee 
on initial reports of State Parties and the cases before the CRPD Committee. Finally, also 
make a reference to the ECtHR cases regarding similar issues where applicable in order to see 
whether there are similarities or differences between the CRPD committee views and ECtHR 
cases.   
 
Equal recognition before the law itself is not the novelty for human rights instruments. On 
universal level, UDHR in its Article 6 acknowledges the right of equal recognition of all 
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persons before the law.102 With Article 16 the ICCPR reaffirms the same right.103 On the 
regional level, ACHR acknowledges recognition of every person before the law,104 as well as 
ACHPR105. Corresponding articles in thematic conventions, such as CEDAW and its Article 
15 establishes equality of women with men before the law.106 However, during the CRPD 
negotiation process in 2005 the question of incorporating an article in the CRPD about equal 
recognition of persons with disabilities before the law and their enjoyment of legal capacity 
faced strong resistance. Objections came not only from developing countries, but from 
representatives of developed ones as well. According to Marianne Schulze, Australian-
Austrian human rights advocate, who was the monitor, analyst, reporter and advocate during 
the CRPD107 negotiations, certain developed countries used “hurtful language and advocated 
for paternalistic wording”.108  
 
Countries such as Russia, China and Syria were trying to convince the Ad Hoc Committee to 
add a footnote to Article 12 explaining that in Chinese, Russian and Arabic translation legal 
capacity would mean only holding the rights and not being entitled to exercise them.109 This 
wording would have been incorporated in the CRPD if not for the active participation of 
NGOs and persons with disabilities in the negotiations. For example, the International 
Disability Caucus informed all delegates about the harm that the inclusion of the footnote 
could bring to the CRPD and the integrity of the text.110 Finally, it was possible to receive the 
consent of mentioned opposing countries by suggesting for them to use the legal capacity 
concept in the same way as it was already used in CEDAW.111  
 
Only one conclusion can be drawn from this debate: despite the acknowledgment of equality 
before the law of all persons in different international or regional treaties starting from the 
UDHR in 1948, recognition of persons with disabilities before the law and their enjoyment of 
legal capacity was still questioned in 2005 during the negotiations over the CRPD. Even after 
																																																						
102 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Paris 10.12.1948, Art 6. 
103 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. New York 16.12.1966, entry into force 23.03.1976, Art 
16. 
104 American Convention on Human Rights. San Jose 22.11.1969, entry into force 18.07.1978, Art 3. 
105 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. Banjul 27.06.1981, entry into force 21.10.1986, Art 3. 
106 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. New York 18.12.1979, entry 
into force 03.09.1981, Art 15. 
107 M. Schulze. Understanding The UN Convention On the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A Handbook on 
the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities. New York: Handicap International 2010, p. 3. 
108 Ibid., p. 84. 
109 T. Degener, A.Begg. From Invisible Citizens to Agents of Change: A Short History of the Struggle for the 
Recognition of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities at the United Nations. – V. D. Fina, R. Cera, G. Palmisano 
(ed), op. cit., p. 24. 
110 Ibid. p. 36. 




the adoption of the treaty, the CRPD Committee had to draft its first GC specifically about the 
Article 12, as they found common failures in understanding the scope of the article in initial 
reports submitted by member States.112 
 
2.2 Debriefing the Content of Article 12 
The wording of paragraph 1, Article 12 of the CRPD underlines that recognition before the 
law of persons with disabilities is not a new concept provided by the CRPD, rather it 
“reaffirms that persons with disabilities have the rights to recognition everywhere as the 
persons before the law”.113 Without having equal recognition before the law or without 
having legal personality it is impossible to speak about the enjoyment of legal capacity. Thus, 
having a legal personality is a precondition for the next step: for being recognized as the 
rights holder and to be able to exercise these rights. 
 
Paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the CRPD calls upon member States to recognize legal capacity 
of persons with disabilities “on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life”.114 First of all, 
the purpose of this article and its revolutionary idea lies in describing persons of disabilities 
as agents, persons who can be responsible for their lives on equal basis with others and can 
make decisions concerning their lives on behalf of themselves. Thus, legal capacity according 
to the CRPD has two meanings: holding the rights on the one hand and exercising these rights 
on the other.115 Exercise of rights, or in other words, enabling persons with disabilities to 
enter into legal relationships, is the main requirement of Article 12. This is where the main 
contradiction and most problematic issues are found. Particularly, how persons with severe 
mental or intellectual disabilities can exercise their rights even if the first GC of the CRPD so 
boldly stresses that “perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity must not be used as 
justification for denying legal capacity.”116  
 
The CRPD committee sees the solution to the above mentioned issue in making a distinction 
between the concepts of legal and mental capacity. According to the CRPD Committee ‘legal 
capacity’ is the “ability to hold rights and duties (legal standing) and to exercise those rights 
and duties (legal agency)”117, while mental capacity is “decision making skills”118 which are 
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different for different people and are based on various factors.119 This approach did not sound 
convincing for some scholars who criticized the solution heavily. For example, according to 
David Bilchitz, it is impossible to separate mental capacity from legal capacity, as capacity to 
engage in relationships with legal consequences requires certain mental abilities.120  Bilchitz 
lists different areas where the approach of the CRPD Committee can lead to severe 
consequences for persons with disabilities. Particularly, failure to intervene to prevent 
committing suicide; participation in court trial when a person is not mentally competent to do 
so; sexual abuse based on “supposed” consent; and prevention from institutionalization when 
there is a lack of home based support.121 David Bilchitz provides an alternative solution 
according to which the worth of human existence lies not only within purposive value, but in 
experiential value too, where autonomous decisions and independence are not the main 
determinants for human rights, but also passivity and dependency, because some may be 
satisfied with limited goals and achievement, others may be interested only in basic needs 
such as food, housing, water and some people may focus on purposive values.122 However, 
the approach offered by Bilchitz relates to neither social model of disability, nor human rights 
model. It is clearly paternalistic and is more in line with the outdated medical model, which 
perceives disability as the reason to deny persons with disabilities certain rights and restrain 
their agency.   
 
In their joint article Director of the Center for Disability Law and Policy, National University 
of Ireland Galway, Professor Eilionoir Flynn123 and Dr. Anna Arstein-Kerslake, academic at 
Melbourne Law School and Establishment Committee Member of the Melbourne Disability 
Institute124 describe the division between mental capacity and legal capacity proposed by the 
CRPD Committee as the “groundbreaking distinction”.125 According to these scholars, the 
distinction between legal and mental capacity has a revolutionary potential in legal capacity 
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support, regardless of disability or decision-making ability”126 and rejection of legal capacity 
generates “uneven power balance that can easily slide into disempowerment, abuse and 
neglect”.127 Echoing the notion of enjoyment of legal capacity on an equal basis with others, 
Gerard Quinn sees the paragraph 2 of Article 12 as a tool for advancing personhood and as 
“the most important constructive function”128 to “open up opportunities for free interaction in 
the life world through contract.”129 
 
The wording of the paragraph about enjoyment of legal capacity in every aspect of life means 
that the CRPD recognizes holding legal capacity not only on civil matters, but also on 
criminal responsibility.130 Even if in its General Comment No 1, the Committee does not 
explicitly mention whether persons with psychosocial needs, mental or intellectual disability 
should stand the criminal trial, concluding observations on state reports allows for detecting 
quite a clear position of the Committee on this matter. For example, the Committee expresses 
concern that criminal justice system of New Zealand allows to declare persons with 
disabilities unfit to stand trial and on this basis deprive them of liberty.131 Furthermore, the 
Committee is concerned, that the system “does not recognize that a person with disabilities 
should only be deprived of liberty when found guilty of a crime, after criminal procedure has 
been followed, with all the safeguards and guarantees applicable to everyone.”132 The same 
issue is raised in concluding observations on Denmark’s report. Particularly, the Committee 
expresses worries that because of their impairment people with disabilities are being 
considered unfit to stand trial and instead of punishment are sentenced to treatment.133 Thus, 
it can be argued that the Committee does not distinguish people based on their disability 
(mental, intellectual) in criminal justice system. 
 
In general, denial is an easy solution when a person or a state cannot deal with the difficult 
issues they face. Restriction of legal capacity of the person who has difficulties in realization 
of their rights, whether based on mental, or intellectual disabilities, is the easiest way to 
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handle the issue. What the CRPD as the document aiming to protect the rights of persons with 
disabilities provides in Paragraph 3 of Article 12  is “access… to the support they may require 
in exercising their legal capacity”.134 According to paragraph 3 of the article, support should 
not be based on best interest, rather it “must respect the rights, will and preferences of persons 
with disabilities and should never amount to substitute decision-making”.135 Emphasis that 
support never means substitute decision-making, rather it should be understood as the 
supported decision making, is also reiterated in observations for States reports on Article 12. 
As of 2018 the CRPD Committee has provided observations regarding 75 initial reports of 
State parties. Analysis of all documents (observations) issued by the CRPD Committee for the 
member States reports demonstrates that there was not a single document without calling 
upon the member States to abolish or replace full or partial guardianship/substitute decision 
making system with supported decision making mechanisms.136  
 
Requirement of the abolition of guardianship/substitute decision making system is based on 
the reality that the guardianship system often leads to harmful consequences for persons with 
disabilities. As there have been no communications brought in front of CRPD Committee on 
this issue yet, the ECtHR cases can provide some good examples to demonstrate how the 
substitute decision-making system can result in isolation of persons with disabilities and the 
loss of control over their lives even when they do not have severe mental or intellectual 
disabilities. In the case Shtukaturov v. Russia137, the applicant was recognized by court as 
legally incapable because of existing guardianship system in Russia and a guardian was 
appointed. As a result the applicant was unable to challenge his guardian’s decision to place 
him in a psychiatric hospital against his will.138 The hospital administration prohibited him to 
communicate with lawyer,139 or to have “any contact with the outside world and was treated 
with strong medicines”.140 ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(1),141 5(4),142 6(1).143 In 
Stanev v. Bulgaria144 case, the guardianship system led the applicant to be placed in a 
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“decaying, dirty and rarely heated in winter”145 social care home with seventy-three other 
inhabitants, with a permission to have a bath only once a week.146 The applicant could not 
choose his place of residence freely as the Bulgarian legislation allows for making such a 
choice only with the guardian’s agreement.147 ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(1),148 
5(4),149 5(5),150 6(1).151 In Kedzior v. Poland152 case, appointment of guardian led to 
declaration of the applicant as totally incapacitated by the request of the guardian.153 Later, 
solely with the request of the guardian, the applicant was placed in the social care home 
where he remained for ten years.154 His request to the domestic courts for restoration of legal 
capacity was rejected, as he did not have the guardian’s consent for lodging the request.155 
Here too the ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(1),156 5(4),157 6(1).158 
 
Paragraph 4 of the CRPD Article 12 provides minimum requirements and guidance, which 
should be taken into account to ensure proper support for exercising legal capacity by persons 
with disabilities. These requirements are: a) respect for the rights, will and preferences; b) 
freedom from conflict of interest; c) freedom from undue influence; d) promoting 
proportionality; e) being tailored to the person’s circumstances; f) application of the shortest 
time possible; g) regular review by independent and impartial authority or judicial body;159 
however, in the GC the CRPD Committee also decided to stress the primary purpose of 
support and among other requirements highlighted  “respect of the person’s rights, will and 
preferences”.160 In order to reaffirm the autonomy of persons with disabilities the CRPD 
Committee also clearly stipulated that the principle of “best interests” contradicts the purpose 
of Article 12 and it should be replaced by “best interpretation of will and preferences”.161  
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The importance of the paradigm shift from the best interests to the best interpretation of will 
and preferences is constantly repeated by the CRPD Committee in observations issued to 
State parties from 2011 to November 2018. The CRPD Committee does not differentiate with 
respect to size, location and economic or social situation of member States. The shift from the 
substitute decision-making system toward the supported decision-making, with respect of 
autonomy, will and preferences of persons with disabilities applies to all States. For example, 
in 2011 the CRPD Committee called upon Spain to replace substitute decision-making regime 
by supported decision making, “which respects person’s autonomy, will and preferences”.162 
In 2014 the CRPD Committee recommended Azerbaijan to introduce supported decision-
making structures with the same wording: “which fully respect the person’s autonomy, will 
and preferences.”163 The same narrative of “respect autonomy, will and preferences” is 
repeated in concluding observations issued in 2018 on initial reports of Algeria164, 
Slovenia165, Haiti166and Poland167. 
 
Arstein-Kerslake and Eilionoir Flynn believe that the strong wording of the CRPD Committee 
on the respect for autonomy, will and preferences of persons with disabilities does not mean 
blanket restriction from the interference of the state. In some cases it is possible not to respect 
certain will and preference of person with disabilities, but according to them, such occasions 
or interference from the part of the state must be allowed by law only in  “rarest situation”.168 
A different question may arise from this debate: if situations where the will and preferences of 
persons with disabilities can be ignored are still allowed, what distinguishes this system from 
the previous guardianship mechanism? Arstein-Kerslake and Eilionoir Flynn answer this 
question by providing explanations according to which, contrary to substituted decision-
making, decision-making support requires good faith and effort to make a decision which 
reflects the person’s wishes; it is more rights-protective, fosters equality and its main goal is 
to restrict external decisions  “which others think is in the person’s objective best 
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interests”,169 and to “ arrive at a decision, as informed as it possibly can be, by the 
individuals’ own will and preferences.”170 
 
Regarding the capability of persons with disabilities (especially persons with severe 
disabilities) to own and control their own finances which is another frequently debated 
subject, the CRPD provides answers in the final paragraph 5 of Article 12. According to the 
provision, the States parties are obliged to ensure that persons with disabilities have the right 
and possibility to own and inherit property, they also have control over their financial affairs, 
access to bank loans, mortgages and that they are not deprived of their property.171 The CPRD 
Committee does not specify in GC whether owning and controlling their financial affairs 
applies to all persons with disabilities; however, in concluding observations to States Parties 
the CRPD Committee clarifies that all persons with disabilities (also those who were deprived 
of legal capacity) have rights to have access to bank services172 and financial affairs.173  
 
The concept of Article 12 as proposed by the CRPD was reproduced in regional legal 
systems. In 2015, nine years after the adoption of the CRPD, the Inter-American Convention 
on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons was adopted. While there were no separate 
statements on legal capacity in international or regional conventions before the CRPD, the 
Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons most likely 
took the CRPD as a guideline and included in Article 30 a statement about equal enjoyment 
of legal capacity by older persons “on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”174 As 
in the CRPD, the above mentioned convention requires from the member States to take 
positive actions and provide older persons with all support they may need to exercise their 
legal capacity;175 respect and take into consideration the will and preferences of older 
persons;176 ensure their right to own and inherit property;177 control their own finances and 
not to be arbitrarily deprived of their property.178 To try and quantify the benefits of the idea 
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49 million people aged 65 years and more who live in the United States only179 can benefit 
from it and according to the World Health Organization, this number will double by 2050.180 
 
12 years since the adoption of the CRPD, the member States of the African Union also 
incorporated the essence of Article 12 of the CRPD in the newly (2018) adopted Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
in Africa. The Protocol is not just a repetition of the CRPD but it changes or adds some 
nuances derived from the regional needs and understandings.181 However, it does not alter the 
core concept of Article 12 of the CRPD. Moreover, it can be argued that the Protocol offers 
clearer statements and imposes obligations on member States in a more concrete language in 
order to ensure higher protection of legal capacity of persons with disabilities. Particularly, 
Article 7 (Equal recognition before the law) of the Protocol reaffirms the notion of equality 
not only “before the law”182, but “under the law” 183 too. Equality under the law is provided 
for in Article 5 (Equality and non-discrimination) of the CRPD (and not in Article 12) in 
order to ensure for persons with disabilities not only protection by the law (equality before the 
law), but also benefits from it (equality under the law).184 It directly states that member States 
are responsible to ensure that non-State actors and other individuals do not infringe on the 
right of exercising legal capacity of persons with disabilities;185 the article directly mentions 
the obligation to review or repeal policies and laws which restrict or limit the legal capacity of 
persons with disabilities;186 it obliges the States to ensure that persons with disabilities hold 
identity documents or other legal papers which are necessary to exercise legal capacity.187 To 
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quantify the effect again, according to the UN human rights office, this provision impacts 84 
million Africans with disabilities.188 
 
2.3 Implication of Article 12 for other CRPD Articles  
Applying the human rights approach in order to understand Article 12 of the CRPD is 
crucially important and as it “strongly influences the exercise of all other human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”189 It is directly linked with Article 13 (access to justice) as without 
legal capacity persons are denied access to justice. Restriction of legal capacity and access to 
justice is the reason why persons with disabilities can be kept in residential institutions 
against their will or informed consent, which is the infringement of Article 14 (liberty and 
security) and Article 25 (right to health, consent). As the CRPD Committee states in GC, 
denial of legal capacity and institutionalization of persons with disabilities against their will, 
without their consent and with consent of guardians/substitute decision makers are still 
pressing problems.190 Without the interpretation of Article 12 based on the will and 
preferences of persons with disabilities, Article 19 (Living independently and being included 
in the community) can also be misinterpreted and misunderstood. Article 19 stipulates that 
“exercising freedom of choice and control over decisions affecting one’s life with the 
maximum level of self-determination and interdependence within society”191 and it requires 
that State Parties provide all support and services chosen by persons with disabilities in 
accordance to their needs and preferences.192  
 
Article 12 also includes direct implications for the right of persons with disabilities to vote 
and for Article 29 (political participation) of the CRPD. For example, Bulgarian legislation 
deprives persons with intellectual disabilities placed under guardianship, of the right to 
vote.193 Moldova does the same and restricts the right to vote194 for persons with disabilities 
who are under guardianship. In Ukraine the legislation prevents persons with disabilities with 
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restricted legal capacity from exercising their right to vote.195 Therefore, it can be argued that 
restriction of legal capacity of persons with disabilities heavily effects their right to exercise 
voting rights and fully participate in political life.  
 
2.4 CRPD Case Study on Article 12 
The CRPD case study is not rich with data yet, especially with respect to Article 12. As of 
2018, the CRPD Committee has adopted a total of fifteen views in response to the received 
communications. Among them, six communications claimed the infringement of Article 12 
by the contracting State party. However, in three communications the CRPD Committee 
concluded that the authors’ claims were inadmissible for further examination with regard to 
Article 12.196 Thus, there are only three communications where the CRPD Committee had to 
assess whether the State party violated Article 12 or not.  
 
In Makarov v. Lithuania197 case, the author’s wife was not provided by the State with 
sufficient legal support and her participation in court hearings as the witness was not ensured 
due to her disability. In the adopted view the Committee declared that under Article 12(3) 
State parties have an obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure access by persons with 
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.198 The breach of 
Article 12(3) in the presented case also violated Article 13(1) because by not providing 
sufficient support for exercising legal capacity, the State also infringed on her right to access 
justice. In the adopted views the Committee also acknowledged that States parties have 
certain margin of appreciation to assess reasonableness and proportionality of support, but if 
evaluation made by the court is “clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice”,199 it 
cannot be taken into account as an objective evaluation. 
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In the case Noble v. Australia,200 the author of the communication was charged in 2001 with 
two counts of sexual penetration of a child under the age of 13 and three instances of 
indecently treating a child aged between 13 to 16.201 In 2002 he was assessed by a psychiatrist 
in order to conclude whether he was mentally impaired or not. Based on the assessment the 
Court found that the author was unfit to plead and was subjected to custody under the 
Mentally Impaired Defendants Act.202 Therefore, the Court did not assess guiltiness of the 
author. Another psychological assessment ten years later concluded that he was able to stand 
before the trial and the author’s legal representative requested from the Court to establish if 
the author was guilty for the criminal charges he had been accused of ten years before, or 
terminate the prosecution in case the author was acquitted.203 However, the Public Prosecutor 
refused to continue further prosecution of the case due to the fact that the author had spent 
substantial time in custody and that the quality of the evidences for conviction was low.204  
 
According to the CRPD Committee view on the above mentioned case, the Australian 
legislation failed to provide equal opportunity for persons with disabilities to exercise their 
legal capacity before the courts if they were found mentally unfit to stand before the trial.205 
The Committee also notes that during the entire 10-year period the judicial system had been 
focused on the mental capacity of the person without giving him the possibility to plead not 
guilty and to challenge the evidences against him.206 Therefore, the decision about being unfit 
to stand before the court due to his intellectual and mental disability and not providing 
adequate support to do so resulted in the denial of his right to exercise his legal capacity to 
plead not guilty and fully deprived him of the opportunity to challenge his status as a sexual 
offender.207 The Committee did not assess Article 12(2)(3) and 13(1) separately, rather the 
assessment was done jointly for both articles and the Committee found violation of both of 
them.208 
 
While the two cases reviewed above indicate the tight linkage and the importance of Article 
12 (Equal recognition before the law) for the exercise of Article 13 (Access to justice), the 
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case Zsolt Bujdoso and others v. Hungary209 discussed below demonstrates how restriction of 
legal capacity influences the right to vote (Article 29). Six persons of the mentioned 
communication were placed under partial or general guardianship, which according to the 
Hungarian legislation is the basis for removing persons from the electoral register.210 Harvard 
Law School Project on Disability submitted to the Committee a quite interesting third party 
intervention regarding the case. According to the intervener, denying the right to vote because 
of disability is direct discrimination based on “unacceptable and empirically unfounded 
stereotype that all persons with disabilities are incapable.”211 The intervener expressed its 
negative observations about the individual assessment of each person to determine whether 
they were capable of making competent choices and provided the following argument: 
“Assessments of voting capacity rest on the assumption that it is permissible to protect the 
integrity of the political system from individuals who are unable to formulate a valid political 
opinion. According to that argument, individuals who are objectively found to lack the 
capacity to vote are by definition unable to vote competently. However … the legitimacy of 
that aim is itself questionable, since it is not for the State to determine what constitutes a valid 
political opinion.”212 The intervener also offered statistics with respect to the situation in 
Hungary, according to which as of 2011, approximately 71,862 persons were denied the right 
to vote out of which only 1,393 persons had severe forms of intellectual disability.213 
 
In the above discussed communication the Committee once again reminded the State that 
under Article 12(2) of the CRPD, States parties must recognize legal capacity of persons with 
disabilities on an equal basis which includes all aspects of life with no exception and have a 
positive duty to provide all necessary measures to guarantee that persons with disabilities are 
actually able to exercise their legal capacity.214 The Committee found the violation of Article 
29 of the CRPD independently and in conjunction with Article 12. The Committee also 
provided a very important statement that assessing an individual’s capacity to determine their 
ability to vote is discrimination and that “this measure cannot be purported to be legitimate. 
Nor is it proportional to the aim of preserving the integrity of the State party’s political 
system.”215 
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Three years before the CRPD Committee adopted its views in Buydoso and others v. Hungary 
communication, the ECtHR in 2010 had the opportunity to assess the deprivation of the right 
to vote for persons with disabilities in the case of Alajos Kiss v. Hungary216. Similar to 
Bujdoso and others case, Kiss lost the right to vote due to having been placed under the 
partial guardianship. In this case, the ECtHR found the violation of Article 3 of Protocol No.1 
of the ECHR.217 The judgment was based on the argument that the Hungarian law imposed 
“an automatic, blanket restriction on the franchise of those under partial guardianship”.218 
According to the ECtHR, Hungary violated Article 3 of Protocol No.1 to the ECHR precisely 
because the State used “indiscriminate removal of voting rights, without an individualized 
judicial evaluation.”219 The reasoning of the ECtHR itself is not in full compliance with the 
idea of Article 12 (equal recognition before the law) and Article 29 (political participation) of 
the CRPD. According to the ECtHR reasoning it could be argued that for the ECtHR it would 
be acceptable to deprive a person of the right to vote in case of individual examination, which 
is incompatible with the CRPD. 
 
2.5 Reservations and Declarations on Article 12 
In addition to all aspects discussed in the previous chapter, it is also important to take a look 
at the reservations and declarations made by member States on the CRPD and the approach of 
the CRPD Committee toward them in order to precisely understand Article 12 of the CRPD. 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Article 2, provides explanation of the term 
of reservation as a unilateral statement made by a State for the purpose to “exclude or to 
modify the legal effect of certain provision of the treaty.”220 Articles 19-23 of the same 
convention further explain permissible scopes within which the reservation can be made and 
to what extent. However, Article 19 of the Vienna Convention lists three grounds in which 
reservations are prohibited. These grounds are: a) when the treaty itself provides an article on 
prohibition of reservations; b) when the treaty provides that only specified reservations can be 
made; or c) reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.221 Unlike 
‘reservations’, the meaning of ‘declaration’ is not defined in Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. However  the UN provides a glossary of terms (general guide) relating to treaty 
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actions, where ‘declarations’ are explained as “interpretation of a particular provision,” which 
clarifies the state’s position and the purpose of declarations is not to exclude or modify the 
legal effect of a treaty.222  
 
In compliance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 46 of the CRPD 
prohibits the use of reservations by member States, which are “incompatible with the object 
and purpose”223 of the CRPD. Nevertheless, 11 states (Canada, Egypt, Estonia, France, 
Ireland, Kuwait, Netherland, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Syria) made reservations and 
declarations on Article 12, which to some extent narrow down the scope of the article, as 
explained in the General Comment No.1 of the CRPD Committee. As of 2018 the CRPD 
Committee issued its concluding observations only to two of the 11 countries listed above: 
Canada and Poland and called upon both States to withdraw their reservations and 
declarations on Article 12. 
 
In its declaration Poland postulated that the State interpreted Article 12 as allowing 
incapacitation of the person if the person suffers from a “mental illness, mental disability or 
other disorder”224 and is “unable to control his or her conduct”. In 2018, the CRPD 
Committee adopted concluding observations on Poland’s initial report and recommended to 
withdraw its declaration on Article 12 and “recalling its general comment No.1 (2014) on 
Equal Recognition Before the Law, to repeal all discriminatory provisions under the Civil 
Code and other legal acts, allowing for deprivation of legal capacity of persons with 
disabilities, considering that legal capacity includes the capacity to be both, a holder of rights 
and an actor under the law.”225 The same call was issued to Canada in 2017 on their 
reservation made on Article 12 (4). In its concluding observation, the CRPD Committee 
recommended to withdraw reservation on Article 12(4) and required to “carry out a process to 
bring into the line with the Convention federal, provincial and territorial legislation that 
allows for the deprivation of legal capacity of persons with disabilities.”226 With these 
statements the CRPD Committee once again underlined that incapacitation of persons with 
disabilities was not permissible under the CRPD and any reservation which allowed 
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incapacitation of persons with disabilities was incompatible with the purpose and object of 
the treaty. 
 
Declarations on the  interpretation of legal capacity as only acquiring a right, without having 
the right to exercise it, was also made by Egypt227 and Syria228. Kuwait made a declaration on 
Article 12 and subjected it to the conditions of Kuwaiti national law.229 With respect to Egypt 
and Syria, even though the CRPD Committee has not yet adopted concluding observations for 
these countries, most probably the Committee will also call on them to withdraw the 
reservations, as it did in the cases of Canada and Poland. As for Kuwait, it will be interesting 
to see whether the CRPD Committee adopts the same approach as the CEDAW Committee. 
In its concluding observations on Kuwaiti report the CEDAW Committee raised concerns on 
arbitrary detention of women in mental health facilities and placing women in Kuwait under 
their husbands’ guardianship.230  
 
Estonia does not interpret Article 12 as allowing incapacitation when the person lacks ability 
to understand his or her actions, but allows restriction of active legal capacity in accordance 
with the domestic law.231 The Estonian Constitution still includes Article 57 which explicitly 
says that a citizen of Estonia “who has been declared by a court to lack legal capacity is 
ineligible to vote.”232 As of 2018 the CRPD Committee has not provided concluding 
observations on the initial report by Estonia, but it is expected that the Committee will call for 
Estonia to withdraw the declaration, considering its concluding observation on Lithuania’s 
initial report, where the Committee recommended Lithuania to “repeal provisions in the law 
and the Constitution denying the right of persons with disabilities to vote and stand for 
election.”233 
 
France has also referred to modalities of disability for exercising active legal capacity with 
regard to Article 29 - the right to vote.234 France has not received concluding observations by 
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the CRPD Committee on its initial report yet, however, a similar situation is addressed in the 
Committee’s concluding observations on Malta’s initial report, where it recommends Malta to 
withdraw its reservation on Article 29, “so that persons with disabilities can exercise the right 
to vote.”235 The CRPD Committee does not allow any space for distinguishing people based 
on the severity of their disability and requires Malta to: “provide the necessary support for 
persons with psychosocial or intellectual disabilities, so that they can participate in such 
processes on an equal basis with others.”236 Therefore, any interpretation of Article 12 which 
can be understood as a restriction of active political and public life based on the modalities of 
disability is not compatible with the CRPD. 
 
The documents analyzed in this chapter provide key indicators for the implementation of 
Article 12 in practice. Due to the novelty and complexity of the issue, the CRPD Committee 
has not yet issued any specific directives concerning the implementation of the article on 
national levels. Rather, it chooses to reiterate the main purposes and the most meaningful 
nuisances of the new model of legal capacity. It is quite correctly pointed out by Anna 
Arstein-Kerslake and Eilionoir Flynn that “the exact parameters of what a ‘universal legal 
capacity model’ would be in practice are still unclear’.237 However, adoption of the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Right of Persons with 
Disabilities in Africa 10 years after the entry into force of the CRPD, and proclaiming in its 
Article 7 (Equal recognition before the law) the same idea firstly proposed by the CRPD; also 
the adoption and the 2017 entry into force of the Inter-American Convention on Protecting 
the Human Rights of Older Persons and using in its Article 30 (Equal recognition before the 
law) the same concept of legal capacity toward older persons as it was used in the CRPD 
allows for the conclusion that despite numerous difficulties in implementation, the proposed 
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3. THE GEORGIAN LEGAL CAPACITY REFORM 
	
3.1 Ruling of The Constitutional Court of Georgia 
In 2014, the Constitutional Court of Georgia (the Court) made its decision (the Decision)  in 
the case filed in 2012 by Irakli Kemoklidze and David Kharadze against the Parliament of 
Georgia.238 For the purposes of the Court’s decision analysis, it would be relevant to take into 
consideration two major facts concerning the case. Firstly, Georgia ratified the CRPD in 
December 2013, almost ten months before the Decision was made. Secondly, the Committee 
had issued its General Comment No1 in April, 2014, six months before the Decision. These 
facts placed additional burden on the Court to take a progressive decision in line with 
international human rights standards.  However, it is hard to conclude whether the Court took 
into account the above mentioned two major facts while making the decision as it does not 
mention any of these developments in its reasoning. There are only two paragraphs in the 
judgment where the Court enlists the international and regional legal instruments: in the first 
paragraph the Court elaborates on taking into account the will of the person and the individual 
intellectual capacity when limiting the legal capacity and it makes reference to the Council of 
Europe documents, such as: Recommendations of Committee of Ministers No.818 (1977), 
adopted 08.10.1977; No. R(83)2, adopted 22.02.1983; No. R(99)4, adopted 23.02.1999; 
Rec(2004)10, adopted 22.09.2004; CM/Rec(2011)4, adopted 21.09.2011) while it omits other 
international instruments such as CRPD.239 In another paragraph the Court expands on the 
prohibition of torture and other cruel treatment, it enlists the following international 
instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Article 7); The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment; ECHR (Article 3)240 and again it does not 
make any reference to the CRPD.  
  
In the Constitutional Court case discussed in this chapter, the claimants requested from the 
Court to declare as unconstitutional the articles of the Civil Code of Georgia, Civil Procedure 
Code of Georgia and the Law on Psychiatric Care, which recognized persons as mentally 
incapacitated due to intellectual development problems and mental illness and thus annulled 
the declaration of intent by persons with restricted legal capacity. According to the claimants, 
recognition of persons with disabilities as legally incapable and restriction of their rights in 
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particular spheres of life were incompatible with the following articles of the Constitution of 
Georgia:  
i) Article 14 (equal recognition before the law)241 - recognizing a person as legally 
incapacitated after which they are banned from taking independent decisions in all 
spheres of life is the unjustified interference with the rights protected under this 
article;242 
ii) Article 16 (right to personal development)243 - exclusion of a legally incapacitated 
person from taking independent decisions about their life and replacing their will 
with the will of the guardian contradicts the right to personal development 
protected under this article;244 
iii) Article 17(1)(2) (inviolability of human dignity, freedom from torture or inhuman 
treatment)245 - existing laws allow doctors to restrict certain rights of legally 
incapacitated persons, which also includes the right to humane treatment, which 
contradicts the right be free from torture and inhuman treatment protected under 
this article;246 
iv) Article 18(1)(2)(protection of liberty of a person, freedom from arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty),247 - pursuant to the existing laws, there is no requirement 
for obtaining consent from the legally incapacitated person to place them in the 
psychiatric facility. This means that even in cases when the legally incapacitated 
person is able to take a rational decision, putting them into the psychiatric facility 
is arbitrary and takes place without their consent. Arbitrary placement in a 
psychiatric facility contradicts the rights protected under this article;248 
v) Article 24(1)(right to receive and disseminate information)249 - according to the 
existing law, a legally incapacitated person is restricted to request information 
stored about her/him from a private medical facility. This contradicts the rights 
protected under this article;250 
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vi) Article 36(1)(right to marry)251 - the right to marry is a personal right and based on 
its nature it should be impossible for the guardian to give the consent for marriage 
on behalf of the ward. Accordingly, interference into this right on the basis of 
intellectual or mental disability violates the rights protected under this article;252 
vii) Article 41(1)(right to access the information stored in state institutions)253 - 
pursuant to the existing law, the legally incapacitated person was restricted to 
request the information stored about her/him from the governmental medical 
facility. This interferes with the rights protected under this article, which are 
similar to the rights protected under Article 24 of the Constitution of Georgia. The 
only difference is that while under Article 24 a person is eligible to request 
information from the private entity, Article 41 guarantees the right to request 
information from the Government;254 
viii) Article 42(1)(right to apply to the court)255 - according to the existing law, the 
legally incapacitated person was deprived of the right to apply to the court and the 
restriction of this right makes it possible for the guardian, family member, or 
medical facility personnel to abuse their power and refuse the legally incapacitated 
person the opportunity to restore his/her legal capacity. This contradicts the rights 
protected under this article;256 
 
The claimants mainly argued that the lawmaker had used an indiscriminate approach toward 
persons with mental illness or intellectual disability in order to deprive them from legal 
capacity.257 At the same time, the claimants also accepted that the full removal of legal 
capacity and the replacement of the will of the disabled persons were possible in cases where 
the person was fully lacking the capacity to act on her/his behalf. However, it must be noted 
that as the severity of mental illness or intellectual disability varies from case to case, most 
persons with mental illness or intellectual disability may have the capacity to make decisions 
on their behalf.258  
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During the hearing of this case, a specialist explained existing international mechanisms for 
the limitation of legal capacity: total limitation and functional limitation.259 The specialist also 
clarified that at the time of the hearing Georgia was practicing only total limitation of legal 
capacity and there were no other mechanisms in existence. The absence of such kind of a 
mechanism was not due to technical reasons, but the lack of a proper legal framework.260 
Importantly, the representative of Levan Samkharauli National Forensics Bureau (Forensics 
Bureau)261 spoke in favor of total limitation of legal capacity during the hearing.262 It should 
be stressed because the Forensics Bureau continues to be the only facility designated by law 
to assess the extent of person’s capacity.263 This means that even today the level of disabled 
persons’ capacity is assessed by the facility, which is against having this kind of assessment 
requirements at all. 
 
Free University of Tbilisi also presented their opinion of Amicus Curiae at the hearing. The 
Amicus Curiae also stressed the necessity of discontinuing the un-differential practice of legal 
capacity restriction. Instead it requested from the legislator to allow for partial limitation of 
legal capacity based on the individual assessment264 and thus avoid transferring of all rights of 
the person to the guardian.265 The Amicus Curiae, as well as the claimants, argued that there 
should be a differential treatment towards persons with disabilities; they did not request the 
full prohibition by the legislator of the total deprivation of legal capacity. The Amicus Curiae 
suggested  differential treatment of “peoples with disabilities according to their capacities, 
simply because imposing the same restriction on freedoms of persons of different capabilities 
cannot be justified.”266 
 
The Court assessed compliance with the Constitution under each appealed article separately. 
For the purposes of the presented paper and taking into account the volume of the 
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Constitutional Court judgment, only the most essential reasoning of the Court will be 
analyzed further.  
 
It is not surprising that the first two main questions which the Court tried to address deal with 
the legality of recognition of a person as legally incapacitated and the legality of the 
guardianship system in general. According to the reasoning of the Court, the existing law, 
which completely removes legal capacity from the person; deprives the person of the 
opportunity to act fully independently;267 prohibits them to enter into the contract and to 
express the intent for entering into the contract, is the “interference into the personal 
autonomy, into the right of personal development.”268  
 
The Constitutional Court ruled that the recognition of a person as legally incapacitated is a 
substantial change of the person’s legal status, leading to harsh legal and practical 
consequences.269 Nevertheless, the Court declared that in itself the recognition of the person 
as legally incapacitated is not contradictory to the Constitution as it aims to protect the 
legitimate rights and interests of legally incapacitated persons themselves.270 However, the 
Court did not refrain from discussing the proportionality of the interference into the right to 
personal development in relation to the aim of protecting the rights and interests of legally 
incapacitated persons.271 The Court argued that the main points to be taken into account 
during assessments of legal capacity deprivation include: the form, nature and the 
intensiveness of the interference.272  
 
  
According to the Court’s reasoning, the right to personal development “as natural freedom is 
so fundamental that interference into it with the aim of protection of this person, should be 
used only when this constitutes an extremely necessary measure to protect the interests of this 
person.”273 Further reasoing of the Court directly echoes the CRPD Committee’s approaches. 
Particularly, the Court outlines that “Deriving from the personal autonomy, a human has a full 
right to perform the actions incompatible with the views of an average member of the society, 
if this person realizes the meaning of these actions at least to a certain degree. During the 
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realization of the right to personal autonomy, it is impossible to exclude accidentally making 
the decisions, which are against the personal interests. Such kind of “mistakes” are made even 
by the people with high intellectual capabilities”.274  
 
It needs to be emphasized again that at the time of case the hearing (2012-2014), the Georgian 
legislation recognized only “full legal capacity and full legal incapacitation”.275  In contrast to 
the approaches towards legal capacity practiced in the neighboring states (for example: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia) and even those of other Council of Europe states (for example: 
Ukraine, Belarus), or the Bulgarian Constitutional Court decision on the identical matter in 
the same year,276 the Georgian Constitutional Court required from the legislator to change the 
legislative framework so that it would directly respond to the needs and capacities of an 
individual.277 Taking such an attitude to the matter can be described as a very positive aspect 
of the decision.   
 
The reasoning about the guardianship is similarly progressive. It sounds very up to date too, 
considering that the continued practice of the guardianship system in all member states have 
been a constant subject of critique by the Committee. According to the Constitutional Court 
of Georgia: “the presumption that the guardian acts in a good faith cannot overweigh the 
neglect of the possibility, even if minimal, of the free expression of the will of the person, if 
this person has not lost the ability to express this will.”278 The Court goes on to suggest that 
“guardian, despite how faithfully he acts and despite how close he is, socially or biologically, 
with the person under guardianship, can still never be able to replace his will entirely.”279 
 
In contrast to such progressive viewpoints, the Court surprisingly allows for exceptions as 
well. Particularly, the Court proposes that the full deprivation of legal capacity can be allowed 
only when the person lacks the ability to make decisions in all aspects of his life.280 However, 
the Court offers relatively more progressive opinions regarding the guardianship system. 
Namely, the Court requires from the legislator to limit the scope of guardians only to those 
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spheres, where the ward needs assistance in decision-making and prohibit replacement of the 
will of the ward with that of the guardian.281 
 
The court also stresses that the restriction of the right to marry and other related rights of 
legally incapacitated persons are not compatible with the Constitution. The Court describes it 
as a disruption of social inclusion of persons with disabilities and as an increased 
stigmatization of the already vulnerable social group.282 The Court emphasizes that the 
decision on co-habiting and family relations is highly individual and is more based on 
psycho-social and emotional factors, which are not examined during recognition of the person 
as legally incapacitated.283 According to the Court, due to the fact that the person’s capacities 
in social spheres such as marriage and related activities are not assessed during the process of 
recognizing him/her as legally incapacitated, the practice of depriving them of the right to 
marry is disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional.284 
 
The Court’s reasoning regarding the right to a due process of a mentally incapacitated person 
is in accordance with the CRPD standards. The Court gives due consideration to the 
possibility of a conflict between the will of the guardian and the ward. In case of such conflict 
of interests, the Court finds it important to grant the legally incapacitated person the right to 
apply to the court directly as well as the right to being heard personally in the court.285 The 
Court also acknowledges the likelihood of arbitrariness, manipulation and abuse of power by 
personnel of psychiatric facilities in cases where the legally incapacitated person is stripped of 
all the rights to bring the claim directly and personally before the court.286  
 
The Court argued for the right of legally incapacitated persons to apply to the court by 
stressing that: “the right of access to the courts by the legally incapacitated person should not 
be depending on the will of guardian, family member and psychiatric facility. They should be 
granted access to the court, which includes not only the right to access the court, but also the 
right to bring personal arguments in front of the court”.287 This reasoning was applied by the 
Appeal Court of Tbilisi as well. In 2016 the Appeal Court of Tbilisi made the decision 
regarding the L.T case and cited the above quotation to argue that the legally incapacitated 
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person had the right to apply independently to the courts and request full restoration of her/his 
legal capacity.288 
 
Another important part of the reasoning, which needs to be addressed as well has to do with 
the expression of the will of a legally incapacitated person about her/his placement into a 
psychiatric facility (cases related to this issue are often brought to ECtHR). The Court offered 
a forward-looking argument in this regard as well. Namely, the Court discussed whether the 
guardian’s consent on the placement into the psychiatric facility could be considered as the 
consent made by the legally incapacitated person and concluded that institutionalization of the 
person at a medical facility was a high intensity interference with personal liberty;289 
consequently, and for the purposes of the relevant articles of Constitution (Article 18 – human 
liberty),290 only the consent of the guardian could not be viewed as the consent of the person 
himself. Thus, the Court adopted a very clear and mainstreamed human rights approach where 
fundamental rights could not be given away – alienated (by contract, by legal guardianship). 
 
The following chapter will review specific legislative amendments made by the Parliament of 
Georgia with regard to legal capacity. The international and regional legal instruments and the 
Georgian Constitutional Court Decision on legal capacity analyzed in previous chapters 
provides for a clear assessment of the successes of the revised Georgian legislation, the gaps 
where it fails to meet the CRPD standards and the remaining impediments it needs to address 
to achieve full compliance with the CRPD. 
 
3.2 Changes in Legislation 
3.2.1 Changes in Georgian Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code 
After the decision of the Constitutional Court on the case of Irakli Kemoklidze and David 
Kharadze v. Georgian Parliament, in February 2015 the Parliamentary Committee on Legal 
Issues developed legislative amendments in order to implement the so-called Legal Capacity 
Reform. Altogether the proposed amendments addressed sixty seven legal acts.291 
Considering the volume of the reform and the purpose of the presented paper, the following 
chapter will examine only those legislative modifications, which reconceptualised the idea of 
legal capacity of persons with disabilities in Georgia and restored their civil and political 
rights, which were previously denied. 
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Unlike the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, which directly prohibits voting for 
incapacitated persons,292 the Constitution of Georgia does not contain similar restrictions. 
Therefore, the main change which caused the paradigm shift from the existing legal capacity 
system towards the new understanding were introduced in the Civil Code of Georgia and the 
Civil Procedure Code of Georgia along with minor modifications of other legal acts. These 
key amendments and the ways they have been applied by Georgian domestic courts are 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
Despite the statement of the Constitutional Court of Georgia that in general declaring a person 
as legally incapacitated was not directly against the Constitution,293 the legislator adopted a 
more progressive approach and fully abolished the practice of recognizing a person as legally 
incapacitated on the basis of disability, particularly “retardation” and “mental illness”, as 
practiced before the 2015 legal capacity reform.294 Instead, the legislator stipulated that “a 
person in need of psychosocial support (the ‘support-recipient), or a person who has fixed 
psychological, mental/intellectual disorders which, when interrelating with other 
impediments, may prevent him/her from participating in public life fully and effectively on 
equal terms with others” has legal capacity.295 
 
With the proposed abolition of incapacitation in the country, the Parliament brought the 
Georgian legislation into full compliance with the requirement of the CRPD on this matter, 
particularly, the requirement of Article 12 and the paradigm shift to the new approach to legal 
capacity. The Georgian definition of a person with psycho-social needs is also in accordance 
with the CRPD. It directly echoes Article 1 of the CRPD according to which “Persons with 
disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others”.296  
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Before the legal capacity reform the legislation imposed a blanket restriction on the 
declaration of intent by the incapacitated person,297 which meant that they were fully denied 
the right to enter into any kind of civil contract despite their intellectual ability to do so. The 
legal capacity reform cancelled this provision and replaced it with an approach, which 
distinguishes persons according to their intellectual and mental capacity to act on behalf of 
themselves. Consequently, the contract concluded by the support-recipient is deemed legal if 
she or he can benefit from the contract, regardless of the supporter approving the contract or 
not. However, in all other cases the legality of such contracts depends on the supporter’s 
approval.298 This amendment prevents  denial of the right to enter into civil contracts for 
persons with disabilities on the one hand, while it also protects the support-recipient from 
concluding non-profitable agreements on the other.  
 
There have been no studies into how the supporters adhere to the law, if there are any 
instances of interference in the will of support-recipient, or if supporters attempt to interpret 
the will of support-recipients. Therefore, it is yet difficult to comment on the practical 
implementation of the amendment described above. 
 
In addition to these rights, the legislator also established certain obligations for support-
recipients. Namely, while prior to the 2015 reform the regulations did not impose any 
obligations on “retarded” or “mentally ill” persons in case of damage caused by them,299 the 
new legislation introduced such kind of obligations. The only exception to this rule is when 
the supporter is designated specifically in order to prevent the support-recipient from causing 
damage to others.300 
	
The Georgian legislation also permitted a blanket ban on the right of incapacitated persons to 
marriage301 before the legal capacity reform. After 2015 the recognition of the right to 
marriage became dependent on the existence of a marriage contract, i.e. the Georgian 
legislation recognizes the marriage of the support-recipient only if the person concludes the 
marriage contract.302 This requirement was heavily criticized by the Public Defender of 
Georgia. According to their 2016 report on the legal capacity reform, it contradicts the idea of 
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the Constitutional Court ruling, which suggested that the restriction of any right should be 
preceded by an individual assessment of the person.303 Moreover, the Public Defender argues 
that the amendment fails to take into consideration whether the person’s right to marriage or 
property disposal has been restricted by the court judgment and that the amendment sets the 
obligation of the marriage contract for any support-recipient person.304   
 
The inconsistency between the revised legislation and its practical implementation is evident. 
With even the Public Defender suggesting that marriage contracts should be concluded only 
in cases assessed and determined by the Courts, one can argue that Georgian legislation 
adopts quite a protective approach towards family relationships when it comes to property 
rights and it is hard to insist on its noncompliance with the international standards. The 
articles imposing these obligations on spouses provide that during conclusion of a marriage 
agreement, when one of the spouses is the support-recipient it is required to involve not only 
the supporter in the process, but also engage the government bodies for guardianship and 
custody.305 Such a high level involvement can play a significant role in preventing any kind of 
arbitrariness and wrongdoings by supporters; however, as there have been no studies as yet 
about the effects of this regulation, it is difficult to argue whether such restriction has a 
positive or negative influence on the lives of persons with disabilities. 
	
The reform also changed the Civil Code provisions on adoption. The previous version of the 
Civil Code directly stated that only persons with full legal capacity could enjoy the right to 
adoption.306 After the reform this issue was entirely regulated by the Georgian law “On 
Adoption and Foster Care”.307 The status of support-recipients with regard to the right to be a 
foster parent was revised twice. According to the initial changes in 2015, support-recipients in 
general were prohibited from acting as foster parents unless otherwise determined by 
courts.308 This provision was not in full compliance with the CRPD and carried a more 
restrictive nature. However, it turned out to be even more progressive than the modifications 
introduced later. Particularly, in 2017 the parliament made a step backwards and, again 
through blanket provisions, restricted the right of support-recipients to foster parenting, 
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simply declaring that they could not have this right.309 This statement in fact reinstates the 
situation which existed before the legal capacity reform. It imposes blanket restrictions and 
denies any possibilities for support-recipients to enjoy the rights related to foster care.  
 
The issue of adoption is even more complicated. The above mentioned law on “Adoption and 
Foster care” is silent about the right of support-recipients to adoption. While the law itself 
does not seem to explicitly restrict this right, the Decree of the Minister of Labour, Health and 
Social Affairs of Georgia lists a number of diseases which are used as the basis for denying 
the right of adoption not only to support-recipients, but the restrictive list can be extended to 
include persons with physical disabilities as well. Particularly, the Decree states that persons 
who have psychical and behavioral disorders;310 profound neurological and muscular diseases 
causing movement and coordination disorders;311 and those with any kind of trauma, which 
have led to obtaining a disability status affecting the capacity to raise a child, cannot be 
adoptive parents.312 Despite the heavily discriminatory nature of this Decree towards all types 
of disabilities the Public Defender of Georgia also fails to address the adoption issues in its 
report, stating that the legislative amendments “mainly resolved all the previous problems” 
concerning adoption313 and reporting only on foster care issues. The Decree clearly imposes 
blanket restrictions on a number of disabled persons to be adoptive parents. It is based on the 
medical model and entirely contradicts the social or human rights approaches to disability. 
Moreover, it strengthens the stereotypes in the society that disabled persons cannot take care 
of children. 
 
Another issue, which was also left beyond the evaluation of the Public Defender, has to do 
with the articles of Georgian Civil Code concerning guardianship and custody. According to 
the version of the Civil Code practiced before the reform, incapacitated people were placed 
under guardianship.314 This provision was removed315 and replaced with a new article 
according to which persons with psycho-social needs are assigned a supporter instead of a 
guardian.316 It is controversial, however, that another article allowing appointment of 
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guardians remains unchanged. This article states that “guardianship and custody shall also be 
established for protecting the personal and property rights, and interests of an adult who is 
unable to exercise her/his rights and to perform her/his duties independently because of 
her/his health condition.”317  
 
Thus, it can be argued that while on the one hand the legislator abolished guardianship in 
general by appointing supporters to those who need them, it retained the permission to place 
adult persons under guardianship due to their health conditions. Based on the analysis of the 
Court cases and Public Defender reports, it is difficult to comment on the actual 
implementation of this article, as none of the available research points to any cases of 
assigning a guardian to a person with the health conditions described in the article. Despite 
the inconsistency, and looking at a broader picture it can be argued that the legislator 
completely removed the system of guardianship for persons with disabilities and by doing so, 
met one of the main requirements of the CRPD which placed Georgia among very few 
countries whose legislation has shifted from substituted decision making to supported 
decision making system. Estonia, for example, continues to practice the guardianship 
system.318 However, it should also be stressed that the abolition of guardianship in Georgia 
and the resulting progressive legislative amendments do not necessarily mean their correct 
implementation in practice, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
The idea of the paradigm shift from substituted decision making to supported decision 
making system in the Georgian legislation is very well demonstrated in Article 1293 of the 
Civil Code of Georgia: “A supporter shall assist a support receiver when she/he concludes a 
transaction to fully comprehend conditions and legal consequences of the transaction if it is 
defined under a court decision”.319 The article also protects support-recipients from possible 
harmful consequences in cases when she/he is unable to express her/his will for more than 
one month. In such occasions and only as an exception, the Court allows the supporter to act 
on behalf of the receiver of support.320 This statement cannot be perceived as illegitimate or 
unreasonable interference in the will of the person. Contrary to the revised provision, the 
previous version of the same article allowed the guardian to conclude all types of transaction 
in all occasions on behalf of the person under guardianship.321  
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The Parliament also established a legislative mechanism to monitor supporters. According to 
the revised legislation, the government authority for guardianship and custodianship is 
obliged to supervise activities of supporters and verify compliance of their actions with the 
scope determined by the court decision.322 Supervision takes place every six months or more 
frequently as determined by the court.323 Furthermore, the legislator clarified the potential 
outcomes of monitoring reports and supervisions324 in more detail and specified situations 
where the supporter is considered to have failed to perform her/his duty adequately.325 These 
articles can be perceived as preventive measures from unlawful interference and actions by 
supporters and they do not contradict the standards of the CRPD. 
 
In addition to the Civil Code, the main conceptual changes were also introduced in the Civil 
Procedure Code of Georgia. Particularly, the current understanding of the capacity to sue and 
be sued was revised. Prior to 2015 guardians and guardianship/custodianship authorities had 
the right to act on behalf of their wards.326 After the reform support-recipients are required to 
be represented by legal representatives in courts only in cases where the Courts has appointed 
a supporter for them to participate in court hearings.327 A completely new paragraph was 
added to the Civil Procedure Code in order to regulate the issue of recognizing a person as a 
support-recipient. The main significance of this addition lies in the fact that it grants the 
person seeking the status of support-recipient the right to apply to courts directly and request 
the status, or if previously recognized as incapacitated, also directly request from the courts to 
reconsider their status and, where possible, fully restore their legal capacity.328 Another 
important and progressive statement was added to the Code with regard to the mandatory 
participation of person with disabilities in court hearings during her/his recognition as the 
support-recipient.329 This modification was possible only due to the total abolition of the 
guardianship system in Georgia. The Estonian legislation where the guardianship system 
remains active, does not mandatorily require participation of persons with disabilities in court 
hearings of legal capacity cases; thus, persons with disabilities in Estonia can be excluded 
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from hearings,330 which mostly results in incorrect appointment of guardianships.331 
However, this provision was somewhat blurred by article 15082(1) in the Georgian Civil 
Code332 pursuant to which, the guardian has an obligation to address the court on behalf of the 
ward in order to recognize her/him as support-recipients and request individual assessment of 
her/his capacity. This article was perceived as contradictory to the Civil Procedure Code and a 
barrier for incapacitated persons to apply directly to the court. The Public Defender of 
Georgia described this provision as an impediment for realization of the right to access 
justice: “possibility for a legally incapable person to address the court with the request or 
revising his/her status is not clearly expressed.”333 However, in August 2016 the Tbilisi 
Appeal Court clarified that the described provision of the Civil Code of Georgia did not 
automatically restrict the right of the incapacitated person to individually apply to the 
Court.334 Thus, the requirement of the CRPD to grant access to justice to all persons of 
disabilities has also been fulfilled at least at a minimum level. Again, the lack of rigorous 
research into the issues of access to justice for persons with disabilities does not allow making 
more profound conclusions other than the minimum level evaluation.    
 
3.2.2 Main Changes in Various National Laws of Georgia 
One of the most important documents among numerous legal acts revised in frames of the 
legal capacity reform is the “Election Code of Georgia”. Before the reform, legally 
incapacitated persons were denied the right to vote.335 After 2015, persons with psycho-social 
needs have been granted the right to vote as a general rule, however, with one exception still 
permitted: a person who is recognized as a support-recipient and is at the same time placed in 
a medical institution cannot have the right to vote.336 The CRPD does not allow any 
restriction of the right to vote. As a comparison, the Estonian legislation is entirely 
inconsistent with the CRPD standards. According to the Estonian legislation, a person who is 
deprived of “his or her active legal capacity with regard to the right to vote shall not have the 
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331 Ibid. 
332 Civil Code of Georgia, final consolidating version, op. cit., Art 15082(1).  
333 Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia 2016, op. cit., p. 36.  
334 Decision of Tbilisi Appeal Court, No. 2b/2803-16, date 02.08.2016. 
335 Sakartvelos saarchevno k'odeksi (Organic Law of Georgia Election Code of Georgia). Adopted 27.11.2011, 
entry into force 10.01.2012. Version as for 29.05.2014-20.03.2015, Art 3(a.g). 




right to vote.”337 Moreover, such person “does not have the right to stand as a candidate.”338 
Thus, the Georgian laws have taken much more progressive steps to grant the voting right to 
persons with psycho-social needs. The practical implementation of this right in Georgia has 
not been studied either by the Public Defender or local non-governmental organizations. 
 
The right to participate in a referendum was revised in the Georgian legislation in the same 
manner as it was done in the Election Code. Namely, pursuant to the Law on Referendums, 
the support-recipient who is at the same time placed in a medical stationary facility cannot 
participate in a referendum.339 The Estonian Referendum Act also builds on the provisions in 
the Estonian Election Act and posits that a person shall not participate in a referendum, if s/he 
has been deprived of her/his active “legal capacity with regard to the right of vote.”340 
	
Although the provisions in the Georgian legislation on voting rights have become more 
compatible with the CRPD as a result of the legal capacity reform, the right to work in public 
service remains restricted. Specifically, the Law on Public Service states that a person cannot 
hold a public service position, if she or he has been decrlared by the court as the support-
recipient.341 Also, the status of a support-recipient is listed as one of the obligatory grounds 
for dismissal from the postion in public service.342  The same restrictions apply to positions in 
local government bodies.343 Interestingly, similar limitations are imposed by the Estonian 
Local Government Organization Act as well. Pursuant to the act, only individuals with full 
legal capacity can be members of municipal administrations344 and the grounds for 
terminating the municipal council membership includes deprivation of legal capacity with 
regard to the right to vote.345 The example of both states demonstrates how legal capacity is 
connected to other rights, including the right to work in this particular case and how the 
approaches of both states are discriminatory, as they put blanket restriction on persons with 
pshycho-social needs to hold positions in local governments and in public service in general.  
																																																						
337 Riigikogu valimise seadus (Riigikogu Election Act). Adopted 12.06.2002, entry into force 02.03.2003, Art 
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338 Ibid., Art 4(5). 
339 K'anoni reperendumis shesakheb (Organic Law of Georgia On Referendums). Adopted 15.05.1996, entry into 
force 12.06.1996, Art 2(2)(a). 
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Adopted 05.02.2014, entry into force 19.02.2014, Art 43(1)(g), Art 56(2)(e). 
344 Kohaliku omavalitsuse korralduse seadus (Riigikogu Local Government Organization Act). Adopted 
02.06.1993, entry into force 02.06.1993, Art 482(1). 





Another significant legislation change restricting the rights of persons who are seeking 
support is the Law of Georgia On Psychosocial Needs Assessment which is a completely new 
document The aim of the law was to designate an entity to assess those seeking the status of a 
person with psycho-social needs and establish the assessment methodology.346 The purpose of 
the presented thesis is not to analyze the performance of multidisciplinary teams and the 
quality of their assessments, therefore, the paper will examine only the major legal issue with 
the proposed new law. According to it, only one government entity “Legal Entity of Public 
Law Levan Samkharauli National Forensics Bureau” is authorized to conduct assessment of 
psycho-social needs of the person.347 The law does not provide any opportunity to appeal the 
assessment results of the Bureau. As the Courts completely rely only on the assessment of the 
Bureau in their decision-making, the lack of opportunities to appeal the assessment results 
and no availability of alternative assessment puts the person with psycho-social needs in a 
vulnerable position.  
	
The issues of abortion and sterilization have also been overlooked by the legislator as well as 
the Public Defender. The Law of Georgia on Health Care offers no regulations regarding 
abortion and sterilization in cases where the patient is the support-recipient,348while the 
Estonian Termination of Pregnancy and Sterilization Act offers different approaches towards 
both issues. Particularly, the act takes into account the consent of a woman with restricted 
legal capacity;349 however, in case of sterilization the will of the woman with restricted legal 
capacity does not play any role.350 Moreover, the Estonian legislation fails to address 
situations where a woman with restricted legal capacity may wish sterilization but the 
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349 Raseduse katkestamise ja steriliseerimise seadus (Termination of Pregnancy and Sterilisation Act). Adopted 
25.11.1998, entry into force 21.12.1998, Art 5(2)(3). 
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3.3 National Court Practices 
For adequate analysis of the implementation of the legal capacity reform in Georgia, it is 
crucial to also examine the rulings of Georgian Common Courts and understand how they 
interpret and apply the new legislative changes in practice. It is important to mention that only 
the Supreme Court judgments are publicly available in Georgia and there is no open access to 
the rulings of the first instance courts. Therefore, in order to expand the scope of the 
presented research and add to the findings of the analysis of the national legislation and the 
2016 report by the Public Defender, copies of court judgments regarding legal capacity had to 
be officially requested from each court of the Common Court system. Notably, the number of 
judgments to be shared by the courts entirely depends on the Court administration itself.352 A 
total of 247 (two hundred forty-seven) judgments from 11 (eleven) different courts located in 
different regions of Georgia or in major cities were collected for the research.353 Out of the 
recieved judgments, 67 (sixty seven) of them are from the same period also covered in the 
Public Defender report: from April 2015 to January 2016.354 The remaining 180 (one hundred 
eighty) judgments have been issued between February 2016 and the end of 2018. They 
provide an opportunity to look at what has changed or has persisted during the three years 
after the Public Defender issued its first recommendations to the Courts to improve their 
approach to the recognition of persons as support-recipient.  
	
According to the report, the Public Defender reviewed altogether three hundred forty-one 
judgments collected from every court in Georgia (April 2015- January 2016). The evaluation 
of these judgments carried out by the Public Defender yielded the following findings: 
i) The majority of the rulings on recognition of individuals as support-recipients 
include only the resolution part, which makes it impossible to identify the need for 
support;355 
ii) The few judgments containing the reasoning part were just templates and without 
substance;356 
iii) The courts tend to have appointed supporters for all types of deals, even for minor 
deals;357 
																																																						
352 E.g. Rustavi City Court provided only 10 judgments, explaining in the letter N489, dated 19.03.2019 that 
providing more judgments would “paralyze the work of the Court office”.  
353 Infra. Appendix 1. Table of Georgian Cases. No response was received from Kutaisi Appeal Court. The Gori 
District Court offered no written statement about the technical problems preventing them to provide the 
judgments, however, a representative of the Courts explained over the phone that due to the large amount of the 
requested material, it was impossible to provide them electronically or mail them to an address outside Georgia. 
354 Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia 2016, op. cit., p. 7.  





iv)  There was no unified form for the resolution part of the judgments.358 
 
Based on these findings, the Public Defender issued the following recommendations to the 
Common Courts of Georgia: 
i) To pay more attention to the reasoning part of the judgements;359 
ii) To consider individual needs as the basis for rulings and reject complete 
substitution;360 
iii) To develop a template for the resolution part of the judgment.361 
 
Based on the analysis of 247 (two hundred forty-seven) court judgments issued from April 
2015 to December 2018 (study period),  the main findings and recommendations offered by 
the Public Defender are considered mostly relevant and appropriate; however, it can also be 
argued that the Courts themselves may not be solely blamed for neglecting individual needs 
of persons and that the reasons for doing so are derived from the assessment reports produced 
by the Forensics Bureau.362 This assumption will be discussed in more detail below.  
	
In its report the Public Defender also heavily criticizes the “alarming”363 court rulings and 
suggests that the legislative amendments only superficially replaced the term “legally 
incapable” with “support recipient” and failed to introduce any substantial improvements in 
the lives of persons with disabilities.364  While it is true that the court rulings can be described 
as flawed and somewhat inadequate at the beginning, the important improvements in the 
rights of persons with disabilities brought by the legal capacity reform should not be 
underestimated. The reform terminated the legal practice of differentiating between people 
based on their psycho-social capacities and established that every person has equal rights 
under the law and before the law to meaningfully participate in court hearings and not be 
viewed as just a passive object of the justice system. Therefore, a close examination of the 
legal acts allows for a conclusion that despite flaws, substantial legislative modifications that 
were introduced in Georgia have conceptually changed the legal status of persons with 
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Unlike those covered in the Public Defender report, the judgments made later differ from 
court to court while they also share certain key characteristics. These differences grew even 
more evident in 2018. For example, no improvements were observed at Zugdidi District 
Court during the study period and consequently all of their rulings are same each year prior to 
2018. All of the thirty judgments of Zugdidi District Court from the study period are some of 
the most restricting in nature compared to rulings from Tbilisi, Batumi, Kutaisi, Akhalkalaki 
and Telavi. Particularly, they restrict the legal capacity of persons with psycho-social needs in 
every aspect of life. After 2016 the Telavi District Court stopped the practice of restricting 
legal capacity in areas such as the right to personal life, the right to free movement, the right 
to free speech, the right to assembly, etc.365 The scope of restrictions by judges continued 
decreasing in 2018 and as of the date of the presented thesis, there are no more statements 
persons with psycho-social needs requiring support in “every aspect of life”. The same 
observation can be made about the judgments of the Tbilisi City Court: they became less 
restricting in 2018 than those made since 2015.  
 
Judgments of Batumi City Court from 2018 are probably the most complete rulings and 
entirely different from those made by other courts. While their judgments contain only the 
resolution part and are mainly 2-4 pages in length, the Batumi City Court judgments are 
inclusive of the descriptive, the reasoning and the resolution parts in full volume. Availability 
and analysis of these judgments made it possible to fully understand the procedures carried 
out by the courts when deciding on the case of supported decision-making.  
 
First of all, the judgments from Batumi City Court demonstrate that the applicants requesting 
to determine the scope of support do not offer their wishes regarding specific areas of support. 
Secondly, the judgements shed some light as to what extent the support-recipient is 
practically engaged in court hearings. Two out of the five judgements indicated that the 
support-recipient could not attend the court hearings due to their health condition and 
therefore their participation was ensured via Skype call.366 The remaining three judgments 
noted that the support-recipients were unable to communicate due to their health 
conditions.367 Thirdly, all of the five judgments include information about the medical 
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diagnosis of the support-recipients, which allows for better understanding the severity of 
disability. Here, it should be pointed out that inclusion of information about the diagnosis 
cannot be perceived as the disclosure of personal information, as all of the one hundred 
seventy-eight judgments shared by different courts were provided in an encoded manner 
without the possibility to identify the individuals. Fourthly, the Batumi City Court judgments 
clarify the role that the court plays in the assessments performed by the Forensics Bureau and 
the extent to which the court relies on these assessments in their decision-making. Fifth, the 
reasoning parts of the judgments reiterated the article from the Civil Procedure Code, which 
underlines the right of persons with psycho-social needs to directly apply to the court without 
the consent of their supporters. Finally, the resolution parts of the Batumi Court rulings 
comprehensively describe all obligations of the supporter towards the support-recipients. 
	
The prevailing issue with all of the judgments including those from Batumi City Court 
remains with the designated scope of support. Close analysis of the five judgments from 
Batumi City Court suggests that the court heavily relies on the Forensics Bureau assessments 
and determines the scope of support as suggested by the Forensics Bureau. However, not 
entirely and makes some exceptions. Particularly, in three cases, the Forensics Bureau 
suggested the need of a supporter in all aspects of life while in the remaining two assessments 
the Forensics Bureau listed certain areas of life where support was required. However, in all 
of the five judgments, the court refrained from repeating the wording of the Forensics Bureau 
and did not mention that the applicants needed support in “all aspects of their lives”.    
 
Batumi City Court judgments from 2018 expose another important problem not within the 
legal reform or the court system as such, but in the psychiatric assessments. Particularly, it is 
now evident that the court practice in determining the scope of support directly derives from 
the Forensics Bureau assessments and that the courts are reluctant to act on their own 
initiative or question suggestions of mental health professionals. Thus, the main concern has 
to do with the professionals who have been tasked with the responsibility to assess capacities 
of applicants. Important questions such as: awareness of these professionals about modern 
approaches to disability; the current standing of Georgian psychiatry in relation to the soviet 
practices in this field; assessment instruments and methodology, etc. have not been studied or 





Differences in approaches adopted by psychiatrists and social workers can be detected in the 
Supreme Court judgment from May 2018,368 which is the only Supreme Court judgment 
concerning the legal capacity of a disabled person. In the case the support-recipient applicant 
claimed that there was no legal basis for declaring her/him as the support-recipients. The 
descriptive part of the ruling suggests that during the appeal stages the supporter and the 
support-recipient were both applicants and they were both requesting cancelation of support. 
However, the Social Service Agency insisted on recognizing the person as the support-
recipient. After the psycho-social assessment of the applicant in 2016, the experts had 
diverging opinions: the psychiatrists demanded that the applicant received support in every 
aspect of life, while the social worker argued that the applicant needed support only in health 
care services including taking medication and that s/he could handle other matters, such as 
collecting and spending the disability pension without support. In its judgment, the Supreme 
Court stressed the importance of the psycho-social needs assessment report during decision-
making. It stated that the “Courts assessment and decision should be based on the report of 
qualified specialists.”369 Considering that the Forensics Bureau is the only office designated 
to assess the psycho-social needs of a person, the statement of the Supreme Court may imply 
that all instance court decisions should be heavily and exclusively based on the Forensics 
Bureau report. 
 
The judgment of the Supreme Court does not offer much to discern as to what extent their 
judges understand the very essence of the legal capacity reform. Generally speaking, the 
judgment seems to be very modest and conservative, however, it is hard to argue about the 
correctness of the decision without sufficient information about the actual background 
situation and the severity of the mental disorder of the applicant. Nevertheless, the case 
demonstrates the clear need for the availability of alternative assessments of psycho-social 
needs.  
 
It is important to compare the above-mentioned Supreme Court judgment with the Tbilisi 
Appeal Court decision on the full restoration of legal capacity.370 In its decision the latter 
demonstrated a high-level human rights approach to the issue, however, it is noteworthy that 
in this case the Forensics Bureau did not insist that the applicant needed support. Thus, it 
remains a matter of speculation as to what extent the Appeal Court would share the opinions 
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of mental health professionals had they adopted a different position. Both of these cases are a 
testament of the need for further interdisciplinary research of these issues which would 
examine and analyze not only the legal documents and Court judgments and decisions, but 
the Forensics Bureau reports in connection with the Social Service agency as well as 
recommendations of social workers and experiences of support-recipients and their 
supporters. 
 
In order to better understand how the Common Courts, interpret the obligations of supporters 
and the government bodies for guardianship and custody, it was important to review and 
compare corresponding statements in Court judgments, also considering that the Courts tend 
to adopt different approaches to the question. For example, in 2015 as well as 2016 and 2018 
Akhalkalaki District Court judgments indicate that the supporters are obliged to establish the 
will and choice of support-recipients and help them make decisions according to her/his will 
and choice, which implies distribution of information to the support-recipients in an 
affordable and understandable format.371 This statement is repeated word by word in 
judgments of Ambrolauri District Court;372 Zugdidi District Court373 and Kutaisi City 
Court.374 
 
Until 2018 the Batumi City Court also maintained the same approach; however, in 2018 
different statements started to emerge. Namely, the following are suggested as some of the 
obligations of supporters: to take complete care of the support-recipient; defend her/his 
legitimate interests; be a good care giver and provide all necessary assistance.375 In addition, 
the Court also underlines obligations of the government bodies for guardianship and custody 
and states the following: the government entity for guardianship and custody matters is 
obliged to defend and empower support-recipients and help supporters in implementing 
her/his duties in order to enable them to offer effective assistance to support-recipients in 
making decisions according to their own choices.376 A similar statement about the obligations 
of the government guardianship and custody bodies can be found in Tbilisi City Court 
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judgments between 2015-2018; however, no specific emphasis is placed on the duties of 
supporters to assist support-recipients in the interpretation of her/his will and make their own 
decisions based on it. Instead, these court judgments only point out that supporters must act in 
accordance with the interests of recipients of support. Notably, Telavi District Court 
judgments are similar to Tbilisi City Court rulings in this regard. 
 
Importantly, the statements about the obligations of supporters or the responsibility of 
relevant government bodies to assist support-recipients with the interpretation of her/his will 
and decision-making based on their own will and choice is in accordance with the CRPD 
requirements; however, it is unclear as to what guides the courts to appoint supporters in 
every aspect of life of support-recipients, without exception. The ways the judges interpret 
this issue and the justifications they employ to propose these two contradictory approaches in 
one judgment requires further research and analysis. 
 
The practice and performance of supporters is another area which has not been studied yet 
and which continues to be neglected by the legislation. Analysis of the court judgements 
(with exception of the 2018 Batumi City Court rulings) does not offer sufficient data to 
comment on the type of relationship established between the support-recipient and the 
supporter. According to the five judgments of Batumi City Court, all of the five individuals 
appointed as supporters are relatives of the support-recipient. Whether or not a family 
member or a relative should act as a supporter is a controversial issue. The subject of payment 
for supporter’s services and whether they should be funded by the government or other 
sources is a similarly debated issue. The CRPD does not specify how the practice and 
administration of supporters should be handled. Consequently, different models were 
introduced in different countries. Georgia does not yet have a clear vision on how to proceed 
with these matters, or what international practice could be the most suitable solution for the 






The purpose of the presented paper was to assess and determine whether the implementation 
of Article 12 (Equal recognition before the law) of the CRPD in Georgian legislation 
including the Common Court practice and procedures in this regard, were in compliance with 
the standards set out in the CRPD and particularly Article 12. 
 
In order to better understand the values underpinning the CRPD the thesis analyzed the 
historical development in the approaches to disability and the shift from the medical model to 
the social model of disability, and finally to the human rights approach. While the outdated 
medical model perceived disability as a deviation from normality which needed to be cured, 
the social movements of persons with disabilities emerging in the UK in the 1960’s started to 
actively challenge this approach. Similar to other social movements (women’s liberation, gay 
rights, anti-racism), the disability movement too questioned the deeply rooted tendency in the 
society to describe difference as pathology and deviation from normality. The movement 
called for replacing the medical model of understanding disability with the social model, 
according to which it is the society and the legal, social and physical environment which 
disable people and exclude them from social and political life. The CRPD employs and 
expands on the social model of disability by bringing forward the human rights approach, 
which recognizes persons with disabilities as holders of rights and duties. Understanding the 
evolution of disability approaches is important to appreciate the building blocks of the CRPD 
and clearly illustrate the directions and requirements that the CRPD puts forward to ensure 
effective protection of the rights of persons with disabilities worldwide.  
 
The first research question aimed to analyze the paradigm shift brought by Article 12 and its 
implications for the lives of persons with disabilities. For this purpose, the paper firstly 
examined the content of Article 12 and then studied the CRPD Committee documents 
regarding this particular article and its requirements. Article 12 is one of the most 
revolutionary provisions of the CRPD as it ensures legal capacity of persons with disabilities 
on an equal basis with others internationally, in a legally binding international human rights 
treaty. The main aim of the article is to recognize persons with disabilities as agents, 
individuals who are responsible for their lives and who can make their own decisions 
concerning their lives regardless of the type or severity of disability. The main conceptual 
requirements for the CRPD member States to ensure correct implementation of Article 12 are 




for denying legal capacity to persons with disabilities; (ii) legal capacity of all persons with 
disabilities means both: to hold rights and duties and the ability to exercise them; (iii) a shift 
from the “best interest” paradigm to “respect the rights, will and preferences” of persons with 
disabilities; (iv) abolition of guardianship system and introduction and establishment of 
supported decision-making which respects the person’s autonomy, will and preferences; (v) 
ensuring that persons with disabilities have the rights and possibility to own and inherit 
property and have control over their financial affairs including accessing bank services. 
 
These key requirements are reiterated multiple times in the General Comment No.1 (Article 
12) of the CRPD; they are emphasized in each concluding observation on State parties’ 
annual reports on the implementation of the CRPD and frequently stressed in cases examined 
by the CRPD Committee.  
 
The second research question looked at how Georgia has implemented Article 12 of the 
CRPD after its ratification in 2014 and in what ways the country has applied the international 
standards of Article 12 in practice. For this purpose, the following documents were analyzed: 
the 2014 Georgian Constitutional Court ruling on legal capacity; the March 2015 Georgian 
legislation revisions regarding legal capacity and the relevant Common Court practice 
between the years of 2015-2018. Importantly, despite the fact that in its judgment the 
Constitutional Court does not mention the ratification of the CRPD by Georgia, the 
approaches offered in the judgment are mostly in line with the CRPD standards.  
 
While the Constitutional Court has stated that deprivation of legal capacity in general is not 
against the Constitution of Georgia, it also argued that the national legislation, which 
completely removed legal capacity from persons with disabilities, disproportionally interfered 
in personal autonomy and the right to personal development. The Court commissioned the 
legislators to revise the legislation so that it would respond to the needs and the capacities of 
an individual. The Court made a much more progressive statement regarding guardianship 
and stressed that regardless of social or biological kinship with the disabled person, guardians 
could never replace the will of the ward. The Court requested from the legislator to prohibit 
any such occasions. The Court also declared certain articles of the Georgian legislation 
limiting or depriving persons with disabilities of the right to marriage as unconstitutional. 
According to the Court, marriage is based on diverse psychosocial and emotional factors, 
which are not examined during recognition of persons as legally incapacitated. By 




or psychiatric facilities) of removing the right of access to justice, the Court emphasized that 
persons with disabilities should have direct access to courts. Recognizing the importance of 
prohibiting interference in personal liberty, the Court established that the consent of the 
guardian to place a person in a medical facility could not be considered as the consent made 
by the person himself/herself. 
 
Following the ratification of the CRPD in 2014 and the Ruling of the Constitutional Court in 
the same year, the Parliament of Georgia introduced the following conceptual amendments 
into the legislation in 2015: (i) the practice of recognizing persons with disabilities as legally 
incapable on the basis of disability (learning disabilities, mental health issues) was fully 
abolished; (ii) a new definition of “person in need of psycho-social support” was introduced; 
(iii) persons with psycho-social needs were granted the right to marriage, however only 
through a marriage contract; (iv) the guardianship system was removed and replaced with a 
new, supported decision making system; (v) persons with psycho-social needs were granted 
the right to apply to the courts directly in order to request support in decision-making or a full 
restoration of their legal capacity; (vi) participation of persons with disabilities in court 
hearings concerning their legal capacity has been mandatorily required; (vii) all persons with 
disabilities were granted the right to vote in elections and referendums regardless of the type 
or severity of disability (except for persons who reside in medical facilities during the 
elections or the referendum).  
 
Considering all the key legislative modifications listed above, it can be argued that the first 
hypothesis of the paper proved to be true; namely that the Georgian legislative amendments 
made in 2015 concerning the legal capacity of persons with disabilities have met the 
minimum main requirement of the international standard set out in the CRPD. However, it 
was also suggested in the second hypothesis that despite these important legislative 
modifications, a number of significant impediments for the effective implementation of the 
reform in practical level remain to be addressed in due time and manner in order for persons 
with disabilities to be able to actually benefit from the reform and meet the CRPD standards 
to the fullest extent. More specifically, the main gaps which should be tackled in the first 
place are those which deny persons with disabilities the right to adoption and foster care and 
the right to hold public service positions. The law on “Psychosocial Needs Assessment” 
should also be revised in order to allow opportunities for seeking alternative assessment of 





Major inconsistences and gaps have been revealed with regard to the Common Court practice 
rather than the legislation. Despite the recommendations made by Public Defender in 2015, 
most of the Courts continue excluding the reasoning parts from their judgments. The close 
analysis of the judgments found that only one Court provides comprehensive reasoning parts 
in its rulings, which proved to be a valuable source of information for assessing the court 
practice. They helped to establish the extent to which persons with disabilities are personally 
involved in court hearings concerning their legal capacity; understand how the designated 
support areas vary from court to court but not from person to person and examine the ways 
some courts employ to refrain from specifying the obligations of supporters as interpreters of 
the will and choices of support-recipients and impose broad obligations on relevant 
government bodies to help supporters to perform their tasks effectively. 
 
Due to the fact that only one Appeal Court judgment and one Supreme Court judgment was 
available for analysis, it is difficult to comment on the practice of high courts with regard to 
legal capacity. These two cases are not identical either in statements or their outcome. While 
the Appeal Court has adopted a progressive and more innovative approach to the matter, the 
Supreme Court seems to have favored a more conservative stance; however, as explained 
earlier, looking at only these two judgments does not allow for more scrutiny and specific 
observations. 
 
Finally, the paper also envisages the potential lessons that the study of the Georgian 
experiences can offer to other countries not only in the post-soviet region but (as it was 
demonstrated in the third chapter of the paper) to other countries as well, including Estonia. 
For this purpose, the paper also provides some suggestions in response to the third question 
on lesson learning. By elaborating on Article 12 of the CRPD and the work of the CRPD 
Committee and analyzing the scope of the 2015 legal capacity reform in Georgia the paper 
offers valuable understanding of what can be considered as compliant with the CRPD; what 
works and what may potentially fail in practice and how the gaps and inconsistencies can be 
tackled with implementing proper legislation, procedures and court practice. 
 
The study has repeatedly exposed the need for further interdisciplinary research of a range of 
issues. Firstly, a clear system of supported decision-making has not been established yet; it 
needs to provide answers to numerous questions including: how the relations between the 
supporter and support-recipient should be regulated? Should the supporter be paid and if so 




professionals be allowed to be supporters or is it better to let family members and relatives 
continue supporting their family members and so on. Secondly, reasons behind the similarity 
of almost all assessments of persons with psycho-social needs performed by the Forensics 
Bureau need to be researched and addressed, as these assessment reports are essential 
documents for Courts to make decisions. The difficulties faced by the representatives of 
Forensics Bureau while fulfilling their duties and the justifications they employ for their 
assessments should be thoroughly examined. Finally, the views and approaches the judges 
adopt towards the issue of legal capacity of persons with disabilities should become a subject 
of close scrutiny: as judges are the main users and interpreters of the legislation, examining 
and analyzing their understanding of the national and international legislation and how they 
apply their knowledge in decision-making will be crucial to advance the rights of persons 
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